{"title":"国内法和国际法中的政治审判","authors":"E. Posner","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.707870","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Due process protections and other constitutional restrictions normally ensure that citizens cannot be tried and punished for political dissent, but these same restrictions interfere with criminal convictions of terrorists and others who pose a non-immediate but real threat to public safety. To counter these threats, governments may use various subterfuges to avoid constitutional protections, often with the complicity of judges, but when they do so, they risk losing the confidence of the public, which may believe that the government targets legitimate political opponents. This paper argues that the amount of process enjoyed by defendants in criminal trials reflects a balancing of these two factors: their dangerousness, on the one hand, and the risk to legitimate political competition, on the other hand. Political trials are those in which the defendant's opposition to the existing government or the constitutional order is the main issue. The paper discusses various ways in which governments and judges adjust process protections, so that a public threat can be countered while the risks to political competition are minimized. International trials are also discussed within this framework.","PeriodicalId":47625,"journal":{"name":"Duke Law Journal","volume":"55 1","pages":"75-152"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8000,"publicationDate":"2005-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"97","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Political Trials in Domestic and International Law\",\"authors\":\"E. Posner\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/SSRN.707870\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Due process protections and other constitutional restrictions normally ensure that citizens cannot be tried and punished for political dissent, but these same restrictions interfere with criminal convictions of terrorists and others who pose a non-immediate but real threat to public safety. To counter these threats, governments may use various subterfuges to avoid constitutional protections, often with the complicity of judges, but when they do so, they risk losing the confidence of the public, which may believe that the government targets legitimate political opponents. This paper argues that the amount of process enjoyed by defendants in criminal trials reflects a balancing of these two factors: their dangerousness, on the one hand, and the risk to legitimate political competition, on the other hand. Political trials are those in which the defendant's opposition to the existing government or the constitutional order is the main issue. The paper discusses various ways in which governments and judges adjust process protections, so that a public threat can be countered while the risks to political competition are minimized. International trials are also discussed within this framework.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47625,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Duke Law Journal\",\"volume\":\"55 1\",\"pages\":\"75-152\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2005-04-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"97\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Duke Law Journal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.707870\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Duke Law Journal","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.707870","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
Political Trials in Domestic and International Law
Due process protections and other constitutional restrictions normally ensure that citizens cannot be tried and punished for political dissent, but these same restrictions interfere with criminal convictions of terrorists and others who pose a non-immediate but real threat to public safety. To counter these threats, governments may use various subterfuges to avoid constitutional protections, often with the complicity of judges, but when they do so, they risk losing the confidence of the public, which may believe that the government targets legitimate political opponents. This paper argues that the amount of process enjoyed by defendants in criminal trials reflects a balancing of these two factors: their dangerousness, on the one hand, and the risk to legitimate political competition, on the other hand. Political trials are those in which the defendant's opposition to the existing government or the constitutional order is the main issue. The paper discusses various ways in which governments and judges adjust process protections, so that a public threat can be countered while the risks to political competition are minimized. International trials are also discussed within this framework.
期刊介绍:
The first issue of what was to become the Duke Law Journal was published in March 1951 as the Duke Bar Journal. Created to provide a medium for student expression, the Duke Bar Journal consisted entirely of student-written and student-edited work until 1953, when it began publishing faculty contributions. To reflect the inclusion of faculty scholarship, the Duke Bar Journal became the Duke Law Journal in 1957. In 1969, the Journal published its inaugural Administrative Law Symposium issue, a tradition that continues today. Volume 1 of the Duke Bar Journal spanned two issues and 259 pages. In 1959, the Journal grew to four issues and 649 pages, growing again in 1970 to six issues and 1263 pages. Today, the Duke Law Journal publishes eight issues per volume. Our staff is committed to the purpose set forth in our constitution: to publish legal writing of superior quality. We seek to publish a collection of outstanding scholarship from established legal writers, up-and-coming authors, and our own student editors.