The Role of Coercion and Falsification in the Preparation of Stalin-era Interrogation Protocols

This article shows the problematic nature of modern studies that consider interrogation protocols of the Stalinist era to be reliable sources in their analyses. To begin with, these studies use primitive and inconsistent methodologies in their analysis of the interrogation protocols. Most of them approach the problem without the appropriate level of criticism, expressing little or no doubt about the content of these documents. Others, which claim to have adopted more specific methodological approaches, often base them on unverified hypotheses instead of empirically-proven principles. Secondly, these studies ignore recent work in neuroscience and cognitive, social, and clinical psychology that shows that coercion and torture undermine the ability of those under interrogation to give credible testimony. Biomedical studies have demonstrated that extremely stressful conditions (torture, coercion, blackmail, fear, deprivation of sleep and food, etc.) impair the function of the mind and erode its ability to retrieve reliable information from memory, especially affecting the accuracy and clarity of these recollections. Such techniques can significantly distort the testimony of detainees and even force those under interrogation to change their testimony, to repeat false information provided by the investigator or to falsely incriminate themselves. Thirdly, these studies overlook the fact that state security officials of that period systematically falsified interrogation protocols. Protocols, as a rule, were drawn up by the investigators and then were simply signed by those under interrogation — a practice that raises questions about how accurately these protocols convey the actual words, expressions and meanings contained in the elicited testimony. What’s more, many investigators are known to have often added details or to have embellished the confessions, while others made up entire conspiracies from scratch, before forcing the suspects to sign protocols recording their false confessions. This article illustrates these theses with evidence from the case of A. V. Putintsev, a state security investigator between 1941–1954.