行政法律解释审查中的规范性规范回避:一个品牌的宪法回避主义

2区 法学 Q1 Social Sciences
Christopher J. Walker
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引用次数: 1

摘要

本文探讨了现代宪法回避(法院必须解释模棱两可的法规,不仅要采用宪法解释,还要避免引起宪法问题的解释)和雪佛龙服从(法院必须服从一个机构对它所管理的模棱两可的法规的合理解释)的相互冲突的命令。虽然法院和评论家认为,宪法回避胜过雪佛龙的服从(在第一步或第二步),但本文主张,现代回避不应在审查行政法律解释中发挥作用。一旦国会授权一个机构解释模棱两可的法律条款,法院就不能简单地使该机构的解释无效,而代之以法院认为更能避免宪法问题的解释。相反,如果一个机构的合理解释引发了宪法问题,法院必须确定该解释是否确实违宪,因此在雪佛龙的第二步中是不允许的解释。这种方法构成了对宪法回避的经典原则的回归,它在最高法院对国家电缆和电信公司诉X品牌互联网服务的裁决中得到了支持。正如该条在各种行政背景下所说明的那样,这种宪法回避的X牌原则对于保持法院、行政部门和国会之间的适当权力分立是必要的。鲁宾院长的行政法网络理论也证明了这一点。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Avoiding Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative Interpretations of the Law: A Brand X Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance
This Article explores the conflicting commands of modern constitutional avoidance (courts must construe ambiguous statutes not only to adopt a constitutional construction but to avoid constructions that raise constitutional questions) and Chevron deference (courts must defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute it administers). While courts and commentators have suggested that constitutional avoidance trumps Chevron deference (at either step one or two), this Article advocates that modern avoidance should play no role in the review of administrative interpretations of law. Once Congress has empowered an agency to interpret an ambiguous statutory provision, a court cannot simply invalidate the agency’s interpretation and replace it with one the court believes better avoids constitutional questions. Instead, if an agency’s reasonable interpretation raises constitutional questions, a court must determine whether the interpretation is indeed unconstitutional and thus an impermissible interpretation at Chevron step two. This approach constitutes a return to the classical doctrine of constitutional avoidance, and it finds support in the Supreme Court’s decision in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services. As the Article illustrates in a variety of administrative contexts, this Brand X doctrine of constitutional avoidance is necessary to preserve a proper separation of powers between the courts, the Executive, and Congress. It is also justified under Dean Edward Rubin’s network theory of administrative law.
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