{"title":"集体诉讼的是非曲直审查","authors":"G. Miller","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.554663","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, the Supreme Court declared that federal courts may not conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action. This proscription - sometimes known as the Eisen rule - has become a pillar of class action practice, both under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and under state-court class action procedures. The rule can have a crucial influence on whether a case is certified as a class action - and, given the importance of certification, on the success or failure of the litigation. This Article analyzes the proper scope of a court's inquiry into merits issues when ruling on motions to certify a class. Part I of the Article distinguishes three approaches to this question: strong-form rules that prohibit inquiries into the merits and require the court to accept as true the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint; weak-form rules that permit reasonable inquiries into the merits as relevant to certification and usually place burdens of production and persuasion on the plaintiff; and super-weak rules which permit or require the court to investigate the class's chances of success in the litigation and place burdens of production and persuasion on the plaintiff. Parts II-VI compare these rules with respect to the values of fidelity to law, accuracy in adjudication, fairness in judgments, fairness in settlements, and judicial economy. Part VII argues that weak-form rules are superior to the alternative approaches.","PeriodicalId":81461,"journal":{"name":"Hofstra law review","volume":"33 1","pages":"2"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2004-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Review of the Merits in Class Action Certification\",\"authors\":\"G. Miller\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/SSRN.554663\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, the Supreme Court declared that federal courts may not conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action. This proscription - sometimes known as the Eisen rule - has become a pillar of class action practice, both under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and under state-court class action procedures. The rule can have a crucial influence on whether a case is certified as a class action - and, given the importance of certification, on the success or failure of the litigation. This Article analyzes the proper scope of a court's inquiry into merits issues when ruling on motions to certify a class. Part I of the Article distinguishes three approaches to this question: strong-form rules that prohibit inquiries into the merits and require the court to accept as true the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint; weak-form rules that permit reasonable inquiries into the merits as relevant to certification and usually place burdens of production and persuasion on the plaintiff; and super-weak rules which permit or require the court to investigate the class's chances of success in the litigation and place burdens of production and persuasion on the plaintiff. Parts II-VI compare these rules with respect to the values of fidelity to law, accuracy in adjudication, fairness in judgments, fairness in settlements, and judicial economy. Part VII argues that weak-form rules are superior to the alternative approaches.\",\"PeriodicalId\":81461,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Hofstra law review\",\"volume\":\"33 1\",\"pages\":\"2\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2004-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"6\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Hofstra law review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.554663\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Hofstra law review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.554663","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Review of the Merits in Class Action Certification
In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, the Supreme Court declared that federal courts may not conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action. This proscription - sometimes known as the Eisen rule - has become a pillar of class action practice, both under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and under state-court class action procedures. The rule can have a crucial influence on whether a case is certified as a class action - and, given the importance of certification, on the success or failure of the litigation. This Article analyzes the proper scope of a court's inquiry into merits issues when ruling on motions to certify a class. Part I of the Article distinguishes three approaches to this question: strong-form rules that prohibit inquiries into the merits and require the court to accept as true the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint; weak-form rules that permit reasonable inquiries into the merits as relevant to certification and usually place burdens of production and persuasion on the plaintiff; and super-weak rules which permit or require the court to investigate the class's chances of success in the litigation and place burdens of production and persuasion on the plaintiff. Parts II-VI compare these rules with respect to the values of fidelity to law, accuracy in adjudication, fairness in judgments, fairness in settlements, and judicial economy. Part VII argues that weak-form rules are superior to the alternative approaches.