技术演进与企业财务报告权力下放

Donald C. Langevoort
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引用次数: 5

摘要

在最近的金融丑闻中,技术发展作为一个潜在的因果因素所起的作用尚未得到充分探讨。本文着眼于技术引发的发行人市场环境、投资者交易行为和技术导向公司使用的工具的变化,以证明这些趋势加剧了不诚实财务报告的动机、机会和合理化潜力。特别是,这些力量表明,相当大一部分财务误报并不是管理者的自私,而是竞争力量产生的可预测的反馈循环。如果是这样的话,在适当的威慑形式(和论坛)以及正在进行的关于财务报告哲学的辩论方面,我们可以吸取重要的教训。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Technological Evolution and the Devolution of Corporate Financial Reporting
The role of technological evolution as a potential causal factor in the recent financial scandals has not yet been fully explored. This paper looks at technology-induced changes in the issuers' marketplace environment, in the trading behavior of investors and in the tools employed by technology-oriented firms to make the case that motive, opportunity and the potential for rationalization of less-than-candid financial reporting were intensified by these trends. In particular, these forces suggest that some sizable portion of financial misreporting was not selfish on the part of managers but a predictable feedback loop generated by competitive forces. If so, there are important lessons to be learned with respect to the appropriate forms of (and forums for) deterrence, as well as with respect to on-going debates about the philosophy of financial reporting.
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