{"title":"克罗地亚的政治顽固性和在线地方预算透明度","authors":"Katarina Ott, Velibor Mačkić, Mihaela Bronić","doi":"10.18045/ZBEFRI.2019.2.553","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Online local budget transparency (OLBT) has been recognized as an important feature of good governance. Accordingly, in this paper, OLBT is measured in all 128 cities and a sample of 100 municipalities in Croatia using several key local budget documents published on local government websites. Using a fixed effect Poisson panel model covering the 2013-2017 period, it is shown that along with residents’ income and fiscal capacity of local governments, political ideology and political competition determine the level of OLBT. This paper contributes to the growing body of budget transparency literature by establishing the importance of political factors as determinants of OLBT in this former socialist, fiscally centralized EU member state and reveals the curious stubbornness of the citizens who consistently vote for non-transparent politicians. The main finding is that political factors (political ideology and political competition) matters in determining OLBT, resulting in suboptimal equilibrium of local governments with low levels of OLBT. The local incumbent concludes that OLBT is not a high priority and that his/her constituency will not hold it against him/her. In this environment such a conclusion stands owing to the fact that voters who are * Received: 19-06-2019; accepted: 02-12-2019 1 This work was supported by the Croatian Science Foundation [grant IP-2014-09-3008]. 2 Professor, Senior Research Advisor, Institute of Public Finance, Smičiklasova 21, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia. Scientific affiliation: public sector economics. Phone: +38514886444. E-mail: kott@ ijf.hr. ORCiD: 0000-0003-2242-4181. Website: http://www.ijf.hr/eng/employees/researchers/7/ katarina-ott-phd/1494/ (corresponding author). 3 Assistant Professor, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Zagreb, Trg J. F. Kennedyja 6, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia. Scientific affiliation: competitiveness analysis, new political economy, political cycles. Phone: +38512383201. E-mail: vmackic@efzg.hr. ORCiD: 0000-0002-32008571. Website: http://www.efzg.unizg.hr/departments/economic-theory/faculty-2831/velibormackic-phd/22082. 4 Senior Research Associate, Institute of Public Finance, Smičiklasova 21, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia. Scientific affiliation: fiscal decentralization and development, tax system, budget transparency. Phone: +38514886444. E-mail: mihaela.bronic@ijf.hr. ORCiD: 0000-00020863-2040. Website: http://www.ijf.hr/eng/employees/researchers/7/mihaela-bronic-phd/150/. Katarina Ott, Velibor Mačkić, Mihaela Bronić • Political Stubbornness and Online... 554 Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2019 • vol. 37 • no. 2 • 553-585 stubborn in their voting patterns refuse to change the incumbent who created nontransparency.","PeriodicalId":44594,"journal":{"name":"Zbornik Radova Ekonomskog Fakulteta u Rijeci-Proceedings of Rijeka Faculty of Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2020-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Political Stubbornness and Online Local Budget Transparency in Croatia\",\"authors\":\"Katarina Ott, Velibor Mačkić, Mihaela Bronić\",\"doi\":\"10.18045/ZBEFRI.2019.2.553\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Online local budget transparency (OLBT) has been recognized as an important feature of good governance. Accordingly, in this paper, OLBT is measured in all 128 cities and a sample of 100 municipalities in Croatia using several key local budget documents published on local government websites. Using a fixed effect Poisson panel model covering the 2013-2017 period, it is shown that along with residents’ income and fiscal capacity of local governments, political ideology and political competition determine the level of OLBT. This paper contributes to the growing body of budget transparency literature by establishing the importance of political factors as determinants of OLBT in this former socialist, fiscally centralized EU member state and reveals the curious stubbornness of the citizens who consistently vote for non-transparent politicians. The main finding is that political factors (political ideology and political competition) matters in determining OLBT, resulting in suboptimal equilibrium of local governments with low levels of OLBT. The local incumbent concludes that OLBT is not a high priority and that his/her constituency will not hold it against him/her. In this environment such a conclusion stands owing to the fact that voters who are * Received: 19-06-2019; accepted: 02-12-2019 1 This work was supported by the Croatian Science Foundation [grant IP-2014-09-3008]. 2 Professor, Senior Research Advisor, Institute of Public Finance, Smičiklasova 21, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia. Scientific affiliation: public sector economics. Phone: +38514886444. E-mail: kott@ ijf.hr. ORCiD: 0000-0003-2242-4181. Website: http://www.ijf.hr/eng/employees/researchers/7/ katarina-ott-phd/1494/ (corresponding author). 3 Assistant Professor, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Zagreb, Trg J. F. Kennedyja 6, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia. Scientific affiliation: competitiveness analysis, new political economy, political cycles. Phone: +38512383201. E-mail: vmackic@efzg.hr. ORCiD: 0000-0002-32008571. Website: http://www.efzg.unizg.hr/departments/economic-theory/faculty-2831/velibormackic-phd/22082. 4 Senior Research Associate, Institute of Public Finance, Smičiklasova 21, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia. Scientific affiliation: fiscal decentralization and development, tax system, budget transparency. Phone: +38514886444. E-mail: mihaela.bronic@ijf.hr. ORCiD: 0000-00020863-2040. Website: http://www.ijf.hr/eng/employees/researchers/7/mihaela-bronic-phd/150/. Katarina Ott, Velibor Mačkić, Mihaela Bronić • Political Stubbornness and Online... 554 Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. 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引用次数: 2
摘要
在线地方预算透明度(OLBT)已被认为是良好治理的一个重要特征。因此,在本文中,使用地方政府网站上公布的几个关键地方预算文件,对克罗地亚所有128个城市和100个城市的OLBT进行了测量。采用覆盖2013-2017年的固定效应泊松面板模型,结果表明,除了居民收入和地方政府财政能力外,政治意识形态和政治竞争也决定了地方政府的治理水平。本文通过确立政治因素在这个前社会主义、财政集中的欧盟成员国中作为OLBT决定因素的重要性,为预算透明度文献的增长做出了贡献,并揭示了一贯投票给不透明政治家的公民的奇怪固执。主要发现是政治因素(政治意识形态和政治竞争)在决定地方政府劳动生产率方面起着重要作用,导致地方政府劳动生产率水平低的次优均衡。当地现任总统认为,OLBT不是优先事项,他/她的选民不会因此反对他/她。在这种环境下,这样的结论是成立的,因为选民是*收:19-06-2019;1本文由克罗地亚科学基金会资助[基金编号:2014-09-3008]。2克罗地亚萨格勒布史密伊克拉索瓦21公共财政研究所教授、高级研究顾问。科学归属:公共部门经济学。电话:+ 1 - 38514886444。电子邮件:kott@ijf.hr。ORCiD: 0000-0003-2242-4181。网站:http://www.ijf.hr/eng/employees/researchers/7/ katarina-ott-phd/1494/(通讯作者)。3萨格勒布大学经济与商业学院助理教授,Trg J. F. Kennedyja,克罗地亚萨格勒布10000。科学归属:竞争力分析、新政治经济学、政治周期。电话:+ 1 - 38512383201。电子邮件:vmackic@efzg.hr。ORCiD: 0000-0002-32008571。网站:http://www.efzg.unizg.hr/departments/economic-theory/faculty-2831/velibormackic-phd/22082。4公共财政研究所高级研究员,克罗地亚萨格勒布smi iklasova 21,10000。科学归属:财政分权与发展、税收制度、预算透明度。电话:+ 1 - 38514886444。电子邮件:mihaela.bronic@ijf.hr。ORCiD: 0000-00020863-2040。网站:http://www.ijf.hr/eng/employees/researchers/7/mihaela-bronic-phd/150/。Katarina Ott, Velibor ma基奇,Mihaela broniki•政治固执和在线…554 Zb。Ekon rad。fak。Rij。•2019•第37卷•no。•553-585顽固的投票模式拒绝改变造成不透明的现任者。
Political Stubbornness and Online Local Budget Transparency in Croatia
Online local budget transparency (OLBT) has been recognized as an important feature of good governance. Accordingly, in this paper, OLBT is measured in all 128 cities and a sample of 100 municipalities in Croatia using several key local budget documents published on local government websites. Using a fixed effect Poisson panel model covering the 2013-2017 period, it is shown that along with residents’ income and fiscal capacity of local governments, political ideology and political competition determine the level of OLBT. This paper contributes to the growing body of budget transparency literature by establishing the importance of political factors as determinants of OLBT in this former socialist, fiscally centralized EU member state and reveals the curious stubbornness of the citizens who consistently vote for non-transparent politicians. The main finding is that political factors (political ideology and political competition) matters in determining OLBT, resulting in suboptimal equilibrium of local governments with low levels of OLBT. The local incumbent concludes that OLBT is not a high priority and that his/her constituency will not hold it against him/her. In this environment such a conclusion stands owing to the fact that voters who are * Received: 19-06-2019; accepted: 02-12-2019 1 This work was supported by the Croatian Science Foundation [grant IP-2014-09-3008]. 2 Professor, Senior Research Advisor, Institute of Public Finance, Smičiklasova 21, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia. Scientific affiliation: public sector economics. Phone: +38514886444. E-mail: kott@ ijf.hr. ORCiD: 0000-0003-2242-4181. Website: http://www.ijf.hr/eng/employees/researchers/7/ katarina-ott-phd/1494/ (corresponding author). 3 Assistant Professor, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Zagreb, Trg J. F. Kennedyja 6, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia. Scientific affiliation: competitiveness analysis, new political economy, political cycles. Phone: +38512383201. E-mail: vmackic@efzg.hr. ORCiD: 0000-0002-32008571. Website: http://www.efzg.unizg.hr/departments/economic-theory/faculty-2831/velibormackic-phd/22082. 4 Senior Research Associate, Institute of Public Finance, Smičiklasova 21, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia. Scientific affiliation: fiscal decentralization and development, tax system, budget transparency. Phone: +38514886444. E-mail: mihaela.bronic@ijf.hr. ORCiD: 0000-00020863-2040. Website: http://www.ijf.hr/eng/employees/researchers/7/mihaela-bronic-phd/150/. Katarina Ott, Velibor Mačkić, Mihaela Bronić • Political Stubbornness and Online... 554 Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2019 • vol. 37 • no. 2 • 553-585 stubborn in their voting patterns refuse to change the incumbent who created nontransparency.