纵向外部性与一次性税收:失业有多大影响?

Q3 Social Sciences

European Journal of Government and Economics Pub Date : 2014-06-27 DOI:10.17979/EJGE.2014.3.1.4298

Diego Martínez‐López, Tomas Sjongren

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引用次数: 125

摘要

本文分析了失业的存在如何影响传统的纵向外部性分析方法。我们讨论了在单一制和联邦制国家提供公共投入的最优规则。我们的研究结果表明，在存在失业的情况下，分散公共投入的支出责任，可以使产出更接近第一最佳水平。此外，我们描述了联邦政府的无能，作为一个斯塔克尔伯格领导人，复制单一的结果，除非有新的政策工具可供政府使用。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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VERTICAL EXTERNALITIES WITH LUMP-SUM TAXES: HOW MUCH DIFFERENCE DOES UNEMPLOYMENT MAKE?

This paper analyses how the existence of unemployment affects the conventional approach to vertical externalities. We discuss the optimality rule for the provision of public inputs both in a unitary and in a federal state. Our findings indicate that decentralising spending responsability on public inputs in the presence of unemployment allows output to be closer to the first best level. Moreover, we describe the inability of the federal government, behaving as a Stackelberg leader, to replicate the unitary outcome, unless there are new policy instruments at government's disposal.

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来源期刊

European Journal of Government and Economics Social Sciences-Public Administration

CiteScore

0.90

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

14 weeks

期刊介绍： The European Journal of Government and Economics (EJGE) is an international academic journal for peer reviewed research on all aspects of government and economics. EJGE is particularly interested in current issues regarding the interrelationship between the fields of government and economics, from the influence of government on the economy (economic policy) to economic explanations of government (public choice). It is also particularly interested in questions directly or indirectly related to Europe.