IFSULDEMINAS农产品公开招标中的机会主义行为-校园不自信

Q3 Engineering
Lucas Deleon Ramirio, Wagner Roberto Pereira, Juciara Nunes de Alcântara
{"title":"IFSULDEMINAS农产品公开招标中的机会主义行为-校园不自信","authors":"Lucas Deleon Ramirio, Wagner Roberto Pereira, Juciara Nunes de Alcântara","doi":"10.1590/1806-9649.2020V28E4832","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"abstract: This study is based on the theory of transaction costs (TCT) to analyze the opportunistic behavior of suppliers in public purchases of agricultural products provided by the private sector. We argue that among the public purchasing modalities, the electronic auction, although using the principles of the reverse English auction and considered as a market structure governance driven by price, presents opportunistic behavior at the time of bidding by the seller, until the closing of the contract with the buyer. We analyzed the differences in price quotations and the closing price of 20 agricultural products purchased in electronic auction of public bidding processes in comparison to the bid prices and of references between the years 2014 to 2017 in the Federal Institute Sul de Minas - Campus Inconfidentes. The results show that there was a discount in the biddings between the years 2014 and 2017, since the repetition of bids in electronic auction forced the reduction of prices by the suppliers. However, it was possible to note opportunism by some agents, in the items in which the public agency under study did not fully specify the bidding product.","PeriodicalId":35415,"journal":{"name":"Gestao e Producao","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Opportunistic behavior in public bidding of agricultural products in IFSULDEMINAS - Campus Inconfidentes\",\"authors\":\"Lucas Deleon Ramirio, Wagner Roberto Pereira, Juciara Nunes de Alcântara\",\"doi\":\"10.1590/1806-9649.2020V28E4832\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"abstract: This study is based on the theory of transaction costs (TCT) to analyze the opportunistic behavior of suppliers in public purchases of agricultural products provided by the private sector. We argue that among the public purchasing modalities, the electronic auction, although using the principles of the reverse English auction and considered as a market structure governance driven by price, presents opportunistic behavior at the time of bidding by the seller, until the closing of the contract with the buyer. We analyzed the differences in price quotations and the closing price of 20 agricultural products purchased in electronic auction of public bidding processes in comparison to the bid prices and of references between the years 2014 to 2017 in the Federal Institute Sul de Minas - Campus Inconfidentes. The results show that there was a discount in the biddings between the years 2014 and 2017, since the repetition of bids in electronic auction forced the reduction of prices by the suppliers. However, it was possible to note opportunism by some agents, in the items in which the public agency under study did not fully specify the bidding product.\",\"PeriodicalId\":35415,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Gestao e Producao\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Gestao e Producao\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1590/1806-9649.2020V28E4832\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"Engineering\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Gestao e Producao","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1590/1806-9649.2020V28E4832","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"Engineering","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

摘要

摘要本研究基于交易成本理论(TCT),分析了公共采购私营部门提供的农产品时供应商的机会主义行为。我们认为,在公共采购模式中,电子拍卖虽然使用了反向英式拍卖的原则,并被认为是一种由价格驱动的市场结构治理,但在卖方投标时,直到与买方签订合同为止,都表现出机会主义行为。我们分析了在公开招标过程中通过电子拍卖购买的20种农产品的报价和收盘价的差异,并将其与2014年至2017年南德米纳斯州联邦研究所-校园不自信的投标价格和参考价格进行了比较。结果表明,2014年至2017年期间的投标存在折扣,因为电子拍卖中的重复投标迫使供应商降低价格。但是,可以注意到一些代理商的机会主义,在所研究的公共机构没有充分说明招标产品的项目中。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Opportunistic behavior in public bidding of agricultural products in IFSULDEMINAS - Campus Inconfidentes
abstract: This study is based on the theory of transaction costs (TCT) to analyze the opportunistic behavior of suppliers in public purchases of agricultural products provided by the private sector. We argue that among the public purchasing modalities, the electronic auction, although using the principles of the reverse English auction and considered as a market structure governance driven by price, presents opportunistic behavior at the time of bidding by the seller, until the closing of the contract with the buyer. We analyzed the differences in price quotations and the closing price of 20 agricultural products purchased in electronic auction of public bidding processes in comparison to the bid prices and of references between the years 2014 to 2017 in the Federal Institute Sul de Minas - Campus Inconfidentes. The results show that there was a discount in the biddings between the years 2014 and 2017, since the repetition of bids in electronic auction forced the reduction of prices by the suppliers. However, it was possible to note opportunism by some agents, in the items in which the public agency under study did not fully specify the bidding product.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
Gestao e Producao
Gestao e Producao Engineering-Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
CiteScore
1.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
23
审稿时长
44 weeks
期刊介绍: Gestão & Produção is a journal published four times a year year (March, June, September and December) by the Departamento de Engenharia de Produção (DEP) of Universidade Federal de São Carlos (UFSCar). The first issue of Gestão & Produção was published in April, 1994. Actually, G&P was result of experience of professors of DEP/UFSCar in editing, in the beginning, "Cadernos DEP" in the 1980s, followed by "Cadernos de Engenharia de Produção". The last three issues of "Cadernos de Engenharia de Produção" were a test previous to the launch of Gestão & Produção because most of the journal characteristics were already established, like regularity.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信