机构专家的位置:协调机构专家与总统权力

IF 3.4 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
W. Wagner
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引用次数: 39

摘要

本文以彼得·施特劳斯(Peter Strauss)的作品为跳板,探讨了负责颁布科学密集型规则的机构(“专家机构”)在总统监督方面的特别不稳定的地位。在过去的三十年中,颁布科学密集型规则的机构通过制定详细的程序来确保有力的科学投入和公众监督,努力提高其规则的问责制和科学可信度。他们通过对其科学政策选择进行多轮公众评论、征求严格的科学同行评议、邀请不同意见以及解释方法和选择来实现这一目标。然而,就在这些专家机构努力在科学和公众评论的基础上建立更严格的决策过程的同时,白宫主要通过其信息和监管事务办公室(OIRA),似乎正在通过其很大程度上不透明的监督过程破坏这些机构的努力。在许多规则设置中,OIRA建议在机构严格的审议程序之外进行数十项复杂的变化,这些变化虽然可能是为了推进更大的政策偏好,但也涉及到机构的支持性技术解释的变化。更有问题的是,大多数甚至所有这些变化都是无形的,通常不会留下指纹,而且几乎总是没有提供任何支持的解释或证据。虽然理论上专家机构和白宫的审查应该组成一个互利的团队——每个人都为科学密集型规则带来重要但不同的观点——但实际上,白宫的秘密干预有可能同时破坏这两个机构过程的合法性。最终的结果是,专家机构模式被削弱,总统审查制度也更加脆弱。文章最后提出了改革制度设计的建议。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A Place for Agency Expertise: Reconciling Agency Expertise with Presidential Power
This Essay uses Peter Strauss’s work as a springboard to explore the particularly precarious position of the agencies charged with promulgating science-intensive rules (“expert agencies”) with respect to presidential oversight. Over the last three decades, agencies promulgating science-intensive rules have worked to enhance the accountability and scientific credibility of their rules by developing elaborate procedures for ensuring both vigorous scientific input and public oversight. They have accomplished this by deploying multiple rounds of public comment on their science-policy choices, soliciting rigorous scientific peer review, inviting dissent, and explaining methods and choices. Yet, at the same time that these expert agencies work to establish more rigorous decision processes grounded in both science and public review, the White House, primarily through its Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), appears to be undermining the agencies’ efforts through its largely nontransparent oversight process. In a number of rule settings, OIRA suggests dozens of intricate changes outside of the agencies’ rigorous deliberative processes that, while presumably intended to advance larger policy preferences, also involve changes to the agencies’ supporting, technical explanations. Even more problematic, most and sometimes all of these changes are made invisibly, often without leaving fingerprints and almost always without providing any supporting explanation or evidence.While in theory the expert agency and White House review should make a mutually-beneficial team - each bringing important, but differing perspectives to bear on science-intensive rules - in practice the White House’s secretive interventions threaten to undermine the legitimacy of both institutional processes simultaneously. The end result is both a weakened expert agency model and a more institutionally tenuous presidential review. The Essay concludes with a proposal for reformed institutional design.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.00
自引率
6.90%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Columbia Law Review is one of the world"s leading publications of legal scholarship. Founded in 1901, the Review is an independent nonprofit corporation that produces a law journal edited and published entirely by students at Columbia Law School. It is one of a handful of student-edited law journals in the nation that publish eight issues a year. The Review is the third most widely distributed and cited law review in the country. It receives about 2,000 submissions per year and selects approximately 20-25 manuscripts for publication annually, in addition to student Notes. In 2008, the Review expanded its audience with the launch of Sidebar, an online supplement to the Review.
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