十字路口的共识惩罚理论

IF 0.1 4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Matías Parmigiani
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引用次数: 1

摘要

典型的功利主义社会保护概念和典型的康德式同意概念在c.s.尼诺为惩罚制度辩护的策略中占据了中心位置。然而,在本文中,我试图证明这两个概念是不可调和的。在这种情况下,作者的观点是,第一个概念,根据作者的伦理理论解释,似乎使诉诸第二个概念变得不必要,而对第一个概念的另一种解释也不会使我们面对一个更好的哲学观点。在本文中,我试图说明,第一个概念(社会保护)和康德概念(同意)的含义只有在我们设法从尼诺自己的伦理理论的角度来解读他的刑罚理论时才能真正得到理解。因此,假设这确实是最好的可能解读,Nino所尝试的策略将面临一个困难的十字路口:既采用了一种社会保护的概念,这种概念将明确地将同意的概念从理论运作的正义性平面上移开;或者,它包含一个更广泛的保护概念,而同意的概念则不那么令人不安。= =地理= =根据美国人口普查,这个县的面积为。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
La teoría consensual de la pena en la encrucijada
espanolTanto el concepto tipicamente utilitarista de proteccion social como el concepto tipicamente kantiano de consentimiento ocupan un lugar central en la estrategia que ensaya C. S. Nino para justificar la institucion del castigo. Sin embargo, en este trabajo intentare demostrar que ambos conceptos son irreconciliables. La encrucijada, en cualquier caso, es la siguiente: mientras el primer concepto, interpretado a la luz de la teoria etica del autor, parece tornar innecesaria la apelacion al segundo concepto, una interpretacion alternativa del primer concepto tampoco nos situaria ante un mejor panorama filosofico. EnglishIn the present article I aim to show that the meaning of the first concept (social protection), as well as the Kantian concept (consent) becomes truly intelligible only when we manage to read Nino’s penal theory in the light of his own ethical theory. Thus, on the hypothesis that this is indeed the best possible reading, the strategy tried out by Nino will have to face a difficult crossroads: either adopt a concept of social protection that will definitely displace the notion of consent from the justifying plane where the theory operates; or embrace a broader idea of protection where the notion of consent finds a less uncomfortable place. As will be argued, none of the alternatives is without its problems.
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来源期刊
Ideas y Valores
Ideas y Valores PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
0.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
27
审稿时长
53 weeks
期刊介绍: Ideas y Valores is a four-monthly publication (April, August and December) of the Department of Philosophy of the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, founded in 1951, which welcomes national and international contributions. Throughout its more than sixty years of existence, the journal''s objective has been to provide a space for the publication and dissemination of philosophical work carried out in Colombia. However, Ideas y Valores has always been in close contact with the philosophical work carried out in Latin America and the world. It currently publishes articles and reviews on all philosophical areas in Spanish, Portuguese and, occasionally, English. The journal also receives translations to Spanish of texts which have lost their copyrights or whose copyrights have been bought by or given to the translator and, by extension, to Ideas y Valores.
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