耐用品销售者何时可以实行跨期价格歧视?

Q4 Business, Management and Accounting

Review of Marketing Science Pub Date : 2015-01-01 DOI:10.1515/roms-2014-0007

Sreya Kolay

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引用次数: 0

摘要

耐用品文献中的一个标准结论是，如果买方对耐用品卖方未来的定价策略有预见，那么卖方就不可能完全实现跨期价格歧视。Bagnoli, Salant和Swierzbinski(1989)在有限的时间范围框架中，买家数量大且数量有限，构建了耐用品卖家能够在其消费者之间完全区分价格的数值例子。本文将Bagnoli等人的例子扩展到耐用品卖家在有限范围内向任意有限数量的具有不同产品保留价格的个体重要消费者销售的一般模型，并提供了卖家均衡定价策略的完整表征。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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When Can a Durable Goods Seller Price Discriminate Intertemporally?

A standard result in the literature on durable goods is that if buyers have foresight regarding a durable goods seller’s future pricing strategies, then the seller cannot perfectly price discriminate intertemporally. In a finite time horizon framework where buyers are large and finite in number, Bagnoli, Salant, and Swierzbinski (1989) constructed numerical examples in which the seller of the durable product is able to perfectly price discriminate across its consumers. This paper extends the examples in Bagnoli et al. to a general model of a durablegoods seller selling over a finite horizon to any finite number of individually significant consumers with different reservation prices for the product and provides a complete characterization of the equilibrium pricing strategies of the seller.

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来源期刊

Review of Marketing Science Business, Management and Accounting-Marketing

CiteScore

1.10

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Review of Marketing Science (ROMS) is a peer-reviewed electronic-only journal whose mission is twofold: wide and rapid dissemination of the latest research in marketing, and one-stop review of important marketing research across the field, past and present. Unlike most marketing journals, ROMS is able to publish peer-reviewed articles immediately thanks to its electronic format. Electronic publication is designed to ensure speedy publication. It works in a very novel and simple way. An issue of ROMS opens and then closes after a year. All papers accepted during the year are part of the issue, and appear as soon as they are accepted. Combined with the rapid peer review process, this makes for quick dissemination.