社会资本、社会政治不稳定与经济发展:一个一般均衡模型

IF 1.1 Q3 ECONOMICS
Javier Alcántar-Toledo, Yannis P. Venieris
{"title":"社会资本、社会政治不稳定与经济发展:一个一般均衡模型","authors":"Javier Alcántar-Toledo, Yannis P. Venieris","doi":"10.15355/EPSJ.9.1.19","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This essay describes the main features of a general equilibrium model of social capital and social conflict. According to the model, agents decide to participate in a number of conflict events while, at the same time, accumulate social capital. In the process, the government interacts with the economic actors by discouraging civil disobedience and social violence. The results show that social conflict is decreasing with the accumulation of physical capital, human capital, social capital, and government expenses on social development programs. Output growth in the economy depends positively upon accumulation of all types of capitals and social development funding, and negatively upon social conflict. More importantly, social capital is found to have a considerable positive effect on growth not only directly via investment, as suggested by recent empirical literature, but also indirectly by reducing the levels of social conflict. The model shows that the growth trajectories of the economy display a history-dependent pattern of growth with multiple-equilibria where countries converge to a nontrivial stable steady-state in the long-run. We also provide evidence in favor of the club convergence hypothesis which is predicated upon the initial levels of all types of capitals and the underlying level of social conflict.","PeriodicalId":43334,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Peace and Security Journal","volume":"9 1","pages":"19-27"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2014-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Social Capital, Sociopolitical Instability, and Economic Development: A General Equilibrium Model\",\"authors\":\"Javier Alcántar-Toledo, Yannis P. Venieris\",\"doi\":\"10.15355/EPSJ.9.1.19\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This essay describes the main features of a general equilibrium model of social capital and social conflict. According to the model, agents decide to participate in a number of conflict events while, at the same time, accumulate social capital. In the process, the government interacts with the economic actors by discouraging civil disobedience and social violence. The results show that social conflict is decreasing with the accumulation of physical capital, human capital, social capital, and government expenses on social development programs. Output growth in the economy depends positively upon accumulation of all types of capitals and social development funding, and negatively upon social conflict. More importantly, social capital is found to have a considerable positive effect on growth not only directly via investment, as suggested by recent empirical literature, but also indirectly by reducing the levels of social conflict. The model shows that the growth trajectories of the economy display a history-dependent pattern of growth with multiple-equilibria where countries converge to a nontrivial stable steady-state in the long-run. We also provide evidence in favor of the club convergence hypothesis which is predicated upon the initial levels of all types of capitals and the underlying level of social conflict.\",\"PeriodicalId\":43334,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Economics of Peace and Security Journal\",\"volume\":\"9 1\",\"pages\":\"19-27\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2014-04-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Economics of Peace and Security Journal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.15355/EPSJ.9.1.19\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economics of Peace and Security Journal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.15355/EPSJ.9.1.19","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

本文描述了社会资本与社会冲突的一般均衡模型的主要特征。根据该模型,代理人决定参与一系列冲突事件,同时积累社会资本。在这个过程中,政府通过劝阻公民不服从和社会暴力与经济行为者互动。结果表明,社会冲突随着物质资本、人力资本、社会资本和政府在社会发展项目上的支出的积累而减少。经济产出增长积极地依赖于各类资本和社会发展资金的积累,消极地依赖于社会冲突。更重要的是,研究发现,社会资本不仅通过投资直接对经济增长产生积极影响(如最近的实证文献所示),还通过降低社会冲突水平间接对经济增长产生积极影响。该模型表明,经济的增长轨迹显示出一种历史依赖的增长模式,具有多重均衡,其中各国在长期内收敛于一个非平凡的稳定稳定状态。我们还提供了支持俱乐部收敛假设的证据,该假设基于所有类型资本的初始水平和潜在的社会冲突水平。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Social Capital, Sociopolitical Instability, and Economic Development: A General Equilibrium Model
This essay describes the main features of a general equilibrium model of social capital and social conflict. According to the model, agents decide to participate in a number of conflict events while, at the same time, accumulate social capital. In the process, the government interacts with the economic actors by discouraging civil disobedience and social violence. The results show that social conflict is decreasing with the accumulation of physical capital, human capital, social capital, and government expenses on social development programs. Output growth in the economy depends positively upon accumulation of all types of capitals and social development funding, and negatively upon social conflict. More importantly, social capital is found to have a considerable positive effect on growth not only directly via investment, as suggested by recent empirical literature, but also indirectly by reducing the levels of social conflict. The model shows that the growth trajectories of the economy display a history-dependent pattern of growth with multiple-equilibria where countries converge to a nontrivial stable steady-state in the long-run. We also provide evidence in favor of the club convergence hypothesis which is predicated upon the initial levels of all types of capitals and the underlying level of social conflict.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
1.00
自引率
0.00%
发文量
7
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信