恐怖和种族灭绝的社会进化跨越时间和地理空间:从进化博弈论的视角

IF 1.1 Q3 ECONOMICS
Charles H. Anderton
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引用次数: 27

摘要

本文运用进化博弈论揭示了一个社会的人际关系和地理特征,这些特征使它容易受到恐怖组织和种族灭绝策划者的内部征服。在模型的无空间版本中确定的条件下,暴力企业家可以创造一个和平的人民群体的社会变形为支持或不抵制针对外部群体的暴力。该模型通过分析摩尔和冯·诺伊曼社区中和平型和攻击性表型之间的相互作用扩展到地理空间。该模型还揭示了政策干预,其中侵略的社会进化从未开始或停止,如果已经在进行中。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Social Evolution of Terror and Genocide across Time and Geographic Space: Perspectives from Evolutionary Game Theory
This article uses evolutionary game theory to reveal the interpersonal and geographic characteristics of a society that make it vulnerable to a conquest from within by terrorist organizations and genocide architects. Under conditions identified in the space-less version of the model, entrepreneurs of violence can create the social metamorphosis of a peaceful people group into one that supports or does not resist violence against an out-group. The model is extended into geographic space by analyzing interactions among peaceful and aggressive phenotypes in Moore and von Neumann neighborhoods. The model also reveals policy interventions in which the social evolution of aggression never gets started or comes to a halt if already underway.
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CiteScore
1.00
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