基于委托代理理论的石油许可证最优激励机制研究

Q4 Economics, Econometrics and Finance

International Journal of Revenue Management Pub Date : 2015-12-24 DOI:10.1504/ijrm.2015.073821

Xinhua Qiu, Zhen Wang

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引用次数: 0

摘要

通过优化石油财政制度的激励机制，可以提高石油生产国的政府收入。本文建立了一个委托代理模型，对油气开采中最常用的财政制度——产量分成合同进行了改进。为实现最优财政设计进行了数值分析，并将新模型应用于中国深水石油合同中。应用结果表明，与旧财政体制相比，东道国政府的预期收入提高了18%。

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Study of optimum incentive mechanism based on principal-agent theory for petroleum licence

Government take of oil producing country can be enhanced by optimising the incentive mechanism of petroleum fiscal system. This paper establishes a principal-agent model to improve the production sharing contract (PSC), which is the most popular fiscal regime in hydrocarbon exploitation. It also conducts a numerical analysis to achieve the optimum fiscal design and applies the new model into a deep-water petroleum contract of China. The application results show that the expected income of host government increases by 18% compared with the old fiscal system.

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来源期刊

International Journal of Revenue Management Economics, Econometrics and Finance-Economics and Econometrics

CiteScore

1.40

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The IJRM is an interdisciplinary and refereed journal that provides authoritative sources of reference and an international forum in the field of revenue management. IJRM publishes well-written and academically rigorous manuscripts. Both theoretic development and applied research are welcome.