差异化薪酬:加州学区如何使用经济激励措施来针对教师

IF 0.2 Q4 EDUCATION & EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH
Katharine O. Strunk, D. Zeehandelaar
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引用次数: 16

摘要

许多地区和学校在招聘和留住拥有满足学生需要的必要资质和技能的教师方面存在困难。这种趋势在低收入、“高需求”的学校和地区尤为严重。因此,地区和学校正在实施旨在改革薪酬的政策,以增加教师招聘和保留。尽管最近关于教师薪酬的讨论主要集中在各地区对绩效工资的使用上,但许多地区已经开始针对特定类型的教师采用差异化的薪酬激励措施,以吸引和留住最优质的教师,同时也吸引和留住各地区在其特定环境下最需要的教师。利用2005-2006学年和2008-2009学年的加州学区自行收集的数据集,研究了加州学区使用定向经济激励措施的频率,以及最有可能实施此类政策的学区类型。虽然加州的许多学区都有针对具有特定技能或证书的教师的经济激励政策,但大多数激励政策都集中在“质量”粗略代理的教师身上。那些针对高需求科目的教师,在很大程度上,集中奖励那些被认证为教授特殊教育学生和英语学习者(ELLs)的教师——很少针对其他难招的科目,如数学或科学的教师。此外,有有限的证据表明,特别是那些“难以配备教职工”的地区——比如那些少数民族和贫困学生比例较高以及学业成绩较低的地区——更有可能实施针对具有特定学科资格的教师的经济激励措施,而不太可能集中精力吸引和留住“高质量”教师。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Differentiated Compensation: How California School Districts Use Economic Incentives to Target Teachers
Many districts and schools have trouble recruiting and retaining teachers who have the necessary credentials and skills to meet the needs of their students. This trend is particularly severe in low-income, "high-needs" schools and districts. As such, districts and schools are implementing policies that are intended to reform compensation in order to increase teacher recruitment and retention. Although much of the recent discussion surrounding teacher compensation has centered around districts' use of merit pay, many districts are already using differentiated compensation incentives to target specific kinds of teachers in an attempt to attract and retain not only the highest quality teachers, but also the teachers districts most need to teach in their specific local contexts. Using a self-collected dataset of California school districts from the 2005-2006 and 2008-2009 school years, the frequency with which districts in California use targeted economic incentives and the kinds of districts that are most likely to implement such policies are examined. While many school districts in California have economic incentive policies targeted at teachers with specific skills or credentials, most incentive policies are focused on teachers with rough proxies for "quality." Those that do target teachers in high-need subjects, for the most part, focus on rewarding those certified to teach special education students and English language learners (ELLs)—few are aimed at teachers of other hard-to-staff subjects such as math or science. In addition, there is limited evidence that particularly "hard-to-staff" districts—such as those with high proportions of minority and poor students and those with low academic achievement—are more likely to implement economic incentives that target teachers with specific subject credentials and are less likely to focus their efforts on attracting and retaining "high-quality" teachers.
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来源期刊
Journal of Education Finance
Journal of Education Finance EDUCATION & EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH-
CiteScore
0.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: For over three decades the Journal of Education Finance has been recognized as one of the leading journals in the field of the financing of public schools. Each issue brings original research and analysis on issues such as educational fiscal reform, judicial intervention in finance, adequacy and equity of public school funding, school/social agency linkages, taxation, factors affecting employment and salaries, and the economics of human capital development.
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