对婴儿脑损伤负有责任的信托:F E诉圣乔治大学医院NHS信托(高等法院,2016年3月18日- McGowan J)

J. Mead
{"title":"对婴儿脑损伤负有责任的信托:F E诉圣乔治大学医院NHS信托(高等法院,2016年3月18日- McGowan J)","authors":"J. Mead","doi":"10.1177/1356262217703438b","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"from an abnormality of the mind, namely paranoid schizophrenia, such that her mental responsibility should be regarded as ‘‘substantially impaired.’’ The claimant pleaded guilty to the offence of manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility, and this plea was accepted by the Crown. Mr Justice Jay held that these facts meant that the conviction was conclusive evidence that EH’s mental functioning was substantially impaired at the time of the offence. He also interpreted the sentencing remarks of the trial judge, Mr Justice Foskett, as supporting the interpretation that this case fell towards the lower end of the spectrum of personal responsibility. In his judgment, it was not open to the claimant to undermine or impugn the findings of Foskett J and he therefore proceeded on the basis that the claimant’s personal responsibility was low and/or less than significant. The judge then turned to relevant case-law. In Clunis v Camden and Islington Health Authority [1998] QB 978 Mr Clunis, a man with a history of mental health problems including schizoaffective disorder, killed a man by stabbing him and pleaded guilty to manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility. The Court of Appeal struck out the whole of his claim against the Health Authority, holding that it was barred by public policy. There were no discernible matters or aspects of factual differentiation between the present claim and that of Mr Clunis. In Gray v Thames Trains Limited [2009] 1 AC 1339, the claimant developed post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of the Ladbroke Grove rail disaster in 1999. While suffering from this disorder he killed a man. His plea to the offence of manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility was accepted by the Crown. The House of Lords held that his claim for loss of liberty, loss of earnings, etc. failed on the basis that he was seeking to obtain compensation for his own criminal conduct. The claimant’s lawyers endeavoured to argue that subsequent observations of the Supreme Court cast doubt upon these rulings, and that therefore it was appropriate for EH’s claim to continue. Mr Justice Jay disagreed. He held that it was clear that these subsequent Supreme Court rulings made no express criticism of either Clunis or Gray. In particular, Clunis had not been expressly disapproved by the Supreme Court. As a consequence, case-law supported the trust’s position and this claim would therefore be struck out. The Judge refused permission for either a ‘‘leap frog’’ appeal to the Supreme Court or a reference to the Court of Appeal. Nicholas Bowen QC and Katie Scott (instructed by Russell-Cooke) appeared for the claimant. Angus Moon QC, Judith Ayling and Cecily White (instructed by DAC Beachcroft) appeared for the trust.","PeriodicalId":89664,"journal":{"name":"Clinical risk","volume":"22 1","pages":"110 - 112"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1356262217703438b","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Trust liable for brain damage to baby: F E v St George’s University Hospitals NHS Trust (High Court, 18 March 2016 – McGowan J)\",\"authors\":\"J. Mead\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/1356262217703438b\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"from an abnormality of the mind, namely paranoid schizophrenia, such that her mental responsibility should be regarded as ‘‘substantially impaired.’’ The claimant pleaded guilty to the offence of manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility, and this plea was accepted by the Crown. Mr Justice Jay held that these facts meant that the conviction was conclusive evidence that EH’s mental functioning was substantially impaired at the time of the offence. He also interpreted the sentencing remarks of the trial judge, Mr Justice Foskett, as supporting the interpretation that this case fell towards the lower end of the spectrum of personal responsibility. In his judgment, it was not open to the claimant to undermine or impugn the findings of Foskett J and he therefore proceeded on the basis that the claimant’s personal responsibility was low and/or less than significant. The judge then turned to relevant case-law. In Clunis v Camden and Islington Health Authority [1998] QB 978 Mr Clunis, a man with a history of mental health problems including schizoaffective disorder, killed a man by stabbing him and pleaded guilty to manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility. The Court of Appeal struck out the whole of his claim against the Health Authority, holding that it was barred by public policy. There were no discernible matters or aspects of factual differentiation between the present claim and that of Mr Clunis. In Gray v Thames Trains Limited [2009] 1 AC 1339, the claimant developed post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of the Ladbroke Grove rail disaster in 1999. While suffering from this disorder he killed a man. His plea to the offence of manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility was accepted by the Crown. The House of Lords held that his claim for loss of liberty, loss of earnings, etc. failed on the basis that he was seeking to obtain compensation for his own criminal conduct. The claimant’s lawyers endeavoured to argue that subsequent observations of the Supreme Court cast doubt upon these rulings, and that therefore it was appropriate for EH’s claim to continue. Mr Justice Jay disagreed. He held that it was clear that these subsequent Supreme Court rulings made no express criticism of either Clunis or Gray. In particular, Clunis had not been expressly disapproved by the Supreme Court. As a consequence, case-law supported the trust’s position and this claim would therefore be struck out. The Judge refused permission for either a ‘‘leap frog’’ appeal to the Supreme Court or a reference to the Court of Appeal. Nicholas Bowen QC and Katie Scott (instructed by Russell-Cooke) appeared for the claimant. Angus Moon QC, Judith Ayling and Cecily White (instructed by DAC Beachcroft) appeared for the trust.\",\"PeriodicalId\":89664,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Clinical risk\",\"volume\":\"22 1\",\"pages\":\"110 - 112\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2016-09-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1356262217703438b\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Clinical risk\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/1356262217703438b\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Clinical risk","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1356262217703438b","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

她的精神异常,即偏执型精神分裂症,她的精神责任应被视为“严重受损”。“原告对过失杀人罪表示认罪,理由是责任减轻,这一抗辩被王室接受。杰伊法官认为,这些事实意味着该定罪是确凿的证据,证明EH的精神功能在犯罪时受到严重损害。他还将初审法官Foskett法官的量刑言论解释为支持此案属于个人责任范围低端的解释。在他的判决中,索赔人不能破坏或质疑Foskett J的调查结果,因此他以索赔人的个人责任很低和(或)不太重大为依据进行诉讼。法官随后转向相关的判例法。在Clunis诉Camden和Islington卫生局[1998]QB 978案中,Clunis先生是一名有精神健康问题史的男子,包括精神分裂情感障碍,他用刀刺死了一名男子,并以减轻责任为由承认过失杀人罪。上诉法院驳回了他对卫生局提出的全部索赔,认为这是公共政策所禁止的。现时的申索与克吕尼先生的申索在事实上并无明显的区别。在格雷诉泰晤士火车有限公司[2009]1 AC 1339案中,原告因1999年拉德布罗克格罗夫铁路事故而患上创伤后应激障碍。在患这种疾病期间,他杀了一个人。他以责任减轻为由对过失杀人罪的抗辩被王室接受了。上议院认为,他关于丧失自由、丧失收入等的索赔无效,因为他是在为自己的犯罪行为寻求赔偿。索赔人的律师努力辩称,最高法院随后的意见对这些裁决产生了怀疑,因此EH继续索赔是适当的。杰伊法官不同意。他认为,很明显,最高法院后来的这些裁决并没有对克伦尼斯或格雷作出明确的批评。特别是,最高法院并没有明确反对Clunis。因此,判例法支持信托的立场,因此这一主张将被取消。法官既不允许向最高法院提出“跳蛙”式上诉,也不允许向上诉法院提起上诉。Nicholas Bowen QC和Katie Scott(在Russell-Cooke的指导下)为原告出庭。法律顾问安格斯·穆恩、朱迪思·艾林和塞西莉·怀特(由DAC Beachcroft指示)出席了信托。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Trust liable for brain damage to baby: F E v St George’s University Hospitals NHS Trust (High Court, 18 March 2016 – McGowan J)
from an abnormality of the mind, namely paranoid schizophrenia, such that her mental responsibility should be regarded as ‘‘substantially impaired.’’ The claimant pleaded guilty to the offence of manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility, and this plea was accepted by the Crown. Mr Justice Jay held that these facts meant that the conviction was conclusive evidence that EH’s mental functioning was substantially impaired at the time of the offence. He also interpreted the sentencing remarks of the trial judge, Mr Justice Foskett, as supporting the interpretation that this case fell towards the lower end of the spectrum of personal responsibility. In his judgment, it was not open to the claimant to undermine or impugn the findings of Foskett J and he therefore proceeded on the basis that the claimant’s personal responsibility was low and/or less than significant. The judge then turned to relevant case-law. In Clunis v Camden and Islington Health Authority [1998] QB 978 Mr Clunis, a man with a history of mental health problems including schizoaffective disorder, killed a man by stabbing him and pleaded guilty to manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility. The Court of Appeal struck out the whole of his claim against the Health Authority, holding that it was barred by public policy. There were no discernible matters or aspects of factual differentiation between the present claim and that of Mr Clunis. In Gray v Thames Trains Limited [2009] 1 AC 1339, the claimant developed post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of the Ladbroke Grove rail disaster in 1999. While suffering from this disorder he killed a man. His plea to the offence of manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility was accepted by the Crown. The House of Lords held that his claim for loss of liberty, loss of earnings, etc. failed on the basis that he was seeking to obtain compensation for his own criminal conduct. The claimant’s lawyers endeavoured to argue that subsequent observations of the Supreme Court cast doubt upon these rulings, and that therefore it was appropriate for EH’s claim to continue. Mr Justice Jay disagreed. He held that it was clear that these subsequent Supreme Court rulings made no express criticism of either Clunis or Gray. In particular, Clunis had not been expressly disapproved by the Supreme Court. As a consequence, case-law supported the trust’s position and this claim would therefore be struck out. The Judge refused permission for either a ‘‘leap frog’’ appeal to the Supreme Court or a reference to the Court of Appeal. Nicholas Bowen QC and Katie Scott (instructed by Russell-Cooke) appeared for the claimant. Angus Moon QC, Judith Ayling and Cecily White (instructed by DAC Beachcroft) appeared for the trust.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信