{"title":"她以后就该死了?什么时候法律上的死亡是由于渎职造成的?","authors":"C. Feeny, Ana Samuel, C. Austin","doi":"10.1177/1356262215616307","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The article examines the law surrounding causation in situations when a death could be said to have been accelerated with particular reference to the case of Davies v Countess of Chester Hospital [2014] EWHC 4294 (QB). In doing so, the authors will argue that there are two options available to the courts, one that is an arbitrary time limit and the second which focuses on materiality.","PeriodicalId":89664,"journal":{"name":"Clinical risk","volume":"21 1","pages":"87 - 91"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1356262215616307","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"She should have died hereafter? When is death caused in law by breach of duty?\",\"authors\":\"C. Feeny, Ana Samuel, C. Austin\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/1356262215616307\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The article examines the law surrounding causation in situations when a death could be said to have been accelerated with particular reference to the case of Davies v Countess of Chester Hospital [2014] EWHC 4294 (QB). In doing so, the authors will argue that there are two options available to the courts, one that is an arbitrary time limit and the second which focuses on materiality.\",\"PeriodicalId\":89664,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Clinical risk\",\"volume\":\"21 1\",\"pages\":\"87 - 91\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2015-09-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/1356262215616307\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Clinical risk\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/1356262215616307\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Clinical risk","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1356262215616307","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
She should have died hereafter? When is death caused in law by breach of duty?
The article examines the law surrounding causation in situations when a death could be said to have been accelerated with particular reference to the case of Davies v Countess of Chester Hospital [2014] EWHC 4294 (QB). In doing so, the authors will argue that there are two options available to the courts, one that is an arbitrary time limit and the second which focuses on materiality.