S. Mallissery, Kun-Yi Chiang, Chun-An Bau, Yu-Sung Wu
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Detection of advanced security attacks that exploit zero-day vulnerabilities or application-specific logic loopholes has been challenging due to the lack of attack signatures or substantial deviations in the overall system behavior. One has to zoom in to the affected code regions and look for local anomalies distinguishable from the benign workload to detect such attacks. We propose pervasive micro information flow tracking (PerMIT) that realizes variable-level online dynamic information flow tracking (DIFT) as a means to detect the attacks. The system uses hardware virtualization extension to monitor access to taint source variables and performs asynchronous code emulation to infer the local information flow. We demonstrate that the pervasive micro information flow can sufficiently capture the attacks and incurs only a small overhead. Given the program source code, the system can further enrich the semantics of micro information flow by embedding the variable names. We have integrated the system with machine learning algorithms to demonstrate the effectiveness of anomaly detection for zero-day attacks with pervasive micro information flow.
期刊介绍:
The "IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing (TDSC)" is a prestigious journal that publishes high-quality, peer-reviewed research in the field of computer science, specifically targeting the development of dependable and secure computing systems and networks. This journal is dedicated to exploring the fundamental principles, methodologies, and mechanisms that enable the design, modeling, and evaluation of systems that meet the required levels of reliability, security, and performance.
The scope of TDSC includes research on measurement, modeling, and simulation techniques that contribute to the understanding and improvement of system performance under various constraints. It also covers the foundations necessary for the joint evaluation, verification, and design of systems that balance performance, security, and dependability.
By publishing archival research results, TDSC aims to provide a valuable resource for researchers, engineers, and practitioners working in the areas of cybersecurity, fault tolerance, and system reliability. The journal's focus on cutting-edge research ensures that it remains at the forefront of advancements in the field, promoting the development of technologies that are critical for the functioning of modern, complex systems.