在阳光的阴影下:透明度对州政治运动的影响

IF 1.3 Q1 LAW
K. WoodAbby, M. SpencerDouglas
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引用次数: 10

摘要

近年来,法院在支持披露要求的同时,宣布了各种竞选财务法律无效。法院认为,信息披露是一种限制较少的根除腐败的手段,而批评者则声称,信息披露会抑制言论,阻碍政治参与。利用2000年至2008年各州选举的个人层面捐款数据,我们发现披露的言论寒蝉效应可以忽略不计。平均而言,当竞选捐款的公众可见度提高时,每个候选人可能会停止捐款的捐赠者不到一个。此外,我们没有观察到小额捐赠者或意识形态异常者的异质效应,尽管第一修正案的判例假设这些捐赠者受到竞选财务法规的不成比例的影响。简而言之,信息披露使言论降温的观点并没有得到数据的有力支持。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
In the Shadows of Sunlight: The Effects of Transparency on State Political Campaigns
Abstract In recent years, the courts have invalidated a variety of campaign finance laws while simultaneously upholding disclosure requirements. Courts view disclosure as a less-restrictive means to root out corruption while critics claim that disclosure chills speech and deters political participation. Using individual-level contribution data from state elections between 2000 and 2008, we find that the speech-chilling effects of disclosure are negligible. On average, less than one donor per candidate is likely to stop contributing when the public visibility of campaign contributions increases. Moreover, we do not observe heterogeneous effects for small donors or ideological outliers despite an assumption in First Amendment jurisprudence that these donors are disproportionately affected by campaign finance regulations. In short, the argument that disclosure chills speech is not strongly supported by the data.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.70
自引率
16.70%
发文量
13
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