The Brown Shoe Case

to go to the Maltese court, and, secondly, the aberrant Maltese choice of law rule contrary to that described in Scrimshire v. Scrimshire " " All nations have consented, or must be presumed to consent, for the common benefit and advantage, that such marriages " that is, marriages contracted by the subjects of those countries abroad " should be good or not, according to the laws of the country where they are made." The Court of Appeal could have discussed the effect of one or other of these facts or both, and they could not have been criticised for saying that without laying down any rule they could not hold a court of the petitioner's domicile competent in these circumstances. Such an approach within the requirements of jurisdictional competence at this point in the development of law relating to the recognition of foreign nullity decrees, might have been fruitful: subsequent cases could decide whether the exclusion of decrees based on an unusual choice of law could fall within a jurisdictional basis. As it is, it seems difficult to suggest that the decision as to discretion was per incuriam, in spite of the failure to consider a dictum in the House of Lords, and the grounds for the exercise of discretion are so wide as to be uncomfortable guides for the future. One is tempted to ask whether the same result would have been achieved if counsel had argued in the sense in which the court found."