CEO信心偏差与战略选择:一个一般框架

IF 1.4 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Applied Economics Pub Date : 2022-05-07 DOI:10.1080/15140326.2022.2053829

Elizabeth Schroeder, C. Tremblay, Victor J. Tremblay

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引用次数: 2

摘要

一个公司的所有者可以选择雇佣一个没有偏见的CEO，也可以选择一个有信心偏见的CEO。我们建立了一个模型，证明所有者的最优选择取决于企业和竞争对手的选择变量是战略替代还是战略互补。当选择变量是两家公司的战略替代或战略互补时，所有者通过雇佣过度自信的ceo来优化。当选择变量是一家公司的替代品和竞争对手公司的补充时，每家公司都通过雇用不自信的首席执行官来实现优化。我们表明，该模型适用于价格和产出竞争、广告、研发支出和产品设计。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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CEO confidence bias and strategic choice: a general framework

ABSTRACT An owner of a firm may choose to hire an unbiased CEO or one with confidence bias. We develop a model that demonstrates that the owner’s optimal choice depends on whether the firm and rival choice variables are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. When choice variables are strategic substitutes or strategic complements for both firms, owners optimize by hiring overconfident CEOs. When choice variables are substitutes for one firm and complements for the rival firm, each firm optimizes by hiring an underconfident CEO. We show that the model applies to price and output competition, advertising, research and development spending, and product design.

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来源期刊

Journal of Applied Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

3.00

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

40 weeks

期刊介绍： The Journal of Applied Economics publishes papers which make a significant and original contribution to applied issues in micro and macroeconomics. The primary criteria for selecting papers are quality and importance for the field. Papers based on a meaningful and well-motivated research problem that make a concrete contribution to empirical economics or applied theory, in any of its fields, are especially encouraged. The wide variety of topics that are covered in the Journal of Applied Economics include: -Industrial Organization -International Economics -Labour Economics -Finance -Money and Banking -Growth -Public Finance -Political Economy -Law and Economics -Environmental Economics