网络拓扑脆弱性/成本权衡:模型、应用和计算复杂性

Q3 Mathematics
Aron Laszka, A. Gueye
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引用次数: 4

摘要

技术网络(如电话和传感器网络、互联网)为现代社会提供了更高的效率,但也使我们暴露在易受攻击的风险之下。减轻这些风险涉及在资源经济受限的情况下设计健壮的网络拓扑。在本研究中,我们从经济角度考虑网络拓扑的脆弱性,并提出安全指标,这是评估我们的解决方案效率所必需的。我们将网络的脆弱性定义为由于战略对手的行动而导致的连接的潜在损失。为了获得漏洞度量,我们重新审视了我们最近引入的网络阻塞博弈模型,该模型为对抗性环境中网络拓扑脆弱性的量化提供了一个框架。我们假设网络运营商同时考虑了安全和经济目标。为了对这些目标建模,我们通过引入运营商的使用成本和预算约束来推广以前的模型。研究了最大成本约束和期望成本约束两种自然约束形式,导出了可行脆弱性/成本区域。由于提议的指标是基于博弈论模型的,因此计算它们可能具有挑战性。为了阐明这些挑战,我们提供了解决提议游戏的彻底的复杂性分析。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Network Topology Vulnerability/Cost Trade-Off: Model, Application, and Computational Complexity
Abstract Technological networks (e.g., telephone and sensor networks, Internet) have provided modern society with increased efficiency, but have also exposed us to the risks posed by their vulnerability to attacks. Mitigating these risks involves designing robust network topologies in situations where resources are economically constrained. In this study, we consider the vulnerability of network topologies from an economic viewpoint and propose security metrics, which are necessary for assessing the efficiency of our solutions. We define the vulnerability of a network as the potential loss in connectivity due to the actions of a strategic adversary. To derive vulnerability metrics, we revisit our recently introduced network blocking game models, which provide a framework for quantifying network topology vulnerability in adversarial environments. We assume that the network operator takes both security and economic goals into consideration. To model these goals, we generalize previous models by introducing usage costs and budget constraints for the operator. We study two natural constraint formulations, the maximum and the expected cost constraints, and derive the feasible vulnerability/cost region. Because the proposed metrics are based on game-theoretic models, computing them can be challenging. To elucidate these challenges, we provide a thorough complexity analysis for solving the proposed games.
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来源期刊
Internet Mathematics
Internet Mathematics Mathematics-Applied Mathematics
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