特许经营中收益分成契约的影响因素:来自韩国特许经营行业的证据

IF 0.9 Q3 ECONOMICS

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC JOURNAL Pub Date : 2022-01-02 DOI:10.1080/10168737.2022.2029929

Jungwon Yeo

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我研究了现有的收入分成合同理论是否可以解释韩国特许经营行业中特许经营合同条款的变化，包括特许权使用费、收入分成程度以及特许经营和公司所有权的混合(合同混合)。本研究使用了一个独特的数据集，该数据集是我在韩国特许经营餐饮业的300个特许经营系统中收集的。我发现基于资本约束的解释在解释特许经营费用时更为一致，而基于道德风险的解释在解释特许权使用费时更为一致。此外，合同长度被发现是最重要的解释变量之一。这些发现证实了收入分成作为一种调整签约双方激励机制的工具的作用，并表明它是特许经营方与特许经营方之间持续合作伙伴关系的一种承诺手段。

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The Factors of Revenue-Sharing Contracts in Franchising: Evidence from the Korean Franchise Industry

I examine whether the existing theories on revenue-sharing contracts can explain variations in the terms of franchise contracts, including royalty rates, the degree of revenue-sharing, and the mix of franchising and company ownership (contract-mixing), in the Korean franchise industry. This study utilizes a unique dataset that I assembled on 300 franchise systems in the franchised restaurant industry in Korea. I find the capital constraint-based explanation is more consistent in explaining the franchise fee, whereas the moral hazard-based explanation is more consistent in explaining the royalty rate. Also, the contract length is found one of the most significant explanatory variables. These findings confirm the role of revenue-sharing as a tool to align the contracting parties' incentives and suggest it be a commitment device to a continued collaborative partnership between franchisors and franchisees.

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来源期刊

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC JOURNAL Economics, Econometrics and Finance-Economics, Econometrics and Finance (all)

CiteScore

2.10

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： International Economic Journal is a peer-reviewed, scholarly journal devoted to publishing high-quality papers and sharing original economics research worldwide. We invite theoretical and empirical papers in the broadly-defined development and international economics areas. Papers in other sub-disciplines of economics (e.g., labor, public, money, macro, industrial organizations, health, environment and history) are also welcome if they contain international or cross-national dimensions in their scope and/or implications.