逃避责任的政治

IF 1.9 2区社会学 Q2 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Journal of Public Policy Pub Date : 1986-10-01 DOI:10.1017/S0143814X00004219

R. Weaver

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引用次数: 1348

摘要

政客们的动机主要是为了避免为不受欢迎的行为受到指责，而不是为受欢迎的行为邀功。这源于选民的“消极偏见”:他们倾向于对实际或潜在的损失比对收益更敏感。避免指责的动机导致政客们采取了一套独特的政治策略，包括议程限制、找替罪羊、“推卸责任”和叛逃(“随波逐流”)，这些策略与他们在追求好政策或最大限度地争取信誉的机会时所采取的策略不同。这些策略反过来导致重要的政策效应，包括放弃自由裁量权，即使它提供了重要的信贷申请机会。

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The Politics of Blame Avoidance

ABSTRACT Politicians are motivated primarily by the desire to avoid blame for unpopular actions rather than by seeking to claim credit for popular ones. This results from voters' ‘negativity bias’: their tendency to be more sensitive to real or potential losses than they are to gains. Incentives to avoid blame lead politicians to adopt a distinctive set of political strategies, including agenda limitation, scapegoating, ‘passing the buck’ and defection (‘jumping on the bandwagon’) that are different than those they would follow if they were primarily interested in pursuing good policy or maximizing credit-claiming opportunities. These strategies in turn lead to important policy effects, including a surrender of discretion even when it offers important credit-claiming opportunities.

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来源期刊

Journal of Public Policy Multiple-

CiteScore

4.40

自引率

8.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Public Policy applies social science theories and concepts to significant political, economic and social issues and to the ways in which public policies are made. Its articles deal with topics of concern to public policy scholars in America, Europe, Japan and other advanced industrial nations. The journal often publishes articles that cut across disciplines, such as environmental issues, international political economy, regulatory policy and European Union processes. Its peer reviewers come from up to a dozen social science disciplines and countries across three continents, thus ensuring both analytic rigour and accuracy in reference to national and policy context.