董事集体持有人对异常应计项目和存货的影响

IF 0.9 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Eric Valenzuela, Ying Chen
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文实证分析了董事群体对盈余管理的影响。我们认为,让一位大股东担任董事会成员将改善公司治理,因为他既有能力也有动机纠正公司中的问题。我们提供的证据表明,董事会中的大股东减少了CEO激励导致的异常营运资本应计金额。我们表明,这主要是通过减少库存的异常增长来实现的。这一发现在繁忙的董事会中最为有力,提供了证据表明,在没有细心的董事会的情况下,董事会成员可以提供强有力的公司治理。我们的研究结果表明,董事阻止人可以为公司发挥重要作用,并可能阻止管理者采取破坏价值的行动。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The impact of director blockholders on abnormal accruals and inventory

This paper empirically analyzes the impact that director blockholders have on earnings management. We argue that having a blockholder serve on the board of directors will improve a firm's corporate governance due to having both the ability and incentive to correct problems in a firm. We provide evidence that the presence of blockholders on the board of directors lowers the amount of abnormal working capital accruals caused by CEO incentives. We show that this is primarily done by reducing abnormal increases in inventory. This finding is most robust among busy boards, providing evidence that director blockholders can provide strong corporate governance in the absence of an attentive board of directors. Our findings suggest that director blockholders can provide an important role for firms and may prevent managers from taking value-destroying actions.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.30
自引率
7.10%
发文量
69
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