Entry decision of a vertically integrated foreign firm with downstream subsidization and upstream privatization

This study considers a vertical structure model in which an upstream state-owned enterprise (SOE) and a downstream domestic firm compete with a vertically integrated foreign firm (VIFF). We consider the cost-inefficiency of the SOE and examine the entry decisions of a VIFF under downstream subsidization. We find that without upstream privatization, the VIFF's entry decision might not be socially desirable unless it enters both markets and the cost inefficiency is intermediate. Additionally, a policy to reduce the cost inefficiency might cause a drastic welfare increase or loss when the VIFF changes its entry decision. We then examine upstream privatization and show that a substantial improvement in cost efficiency can increase welfare with privatization. When the SOE maximizes welfare, however, lesser (greater) cost efficiency improvement is necessary to increase welfare with privatization if the ex-ante cost inefficiency is high (low).