银行业薪酬监管：欧盟奖金上限后执行董事行为与银行业绩

IF 5.4 1区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-08-01 DOI:10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101576

Stefano Colonnello , Michael Koetter , Konstantin Wagner

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引用次数: 0

摘要

作为2013年《资本要求指令IV》的一部分，限制高管可变薪酬的规定可能会影响欧盟银行业的高管流动、薪酬设计和风险承担。目前的研究发现，平均离职率明显较高，但也发现这是由业绩不佳的银行的首席执行官推动的。银行用更高的固定薪酬来抵消奖金上限，以此来补偿高管。尽管我们的证据只是暗示性的，但我们没有发现银行层面的风险承担有所减少，这是监管的一个据称目的。

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Compensation regulation in banking: Executive director behavior and bank performance after the EU bonus cap

The regulation that caps executives’ variable compensation, as part of the Capital Requirements Directive IV of 2013, likely affected executive turnover, compensation design, and risk-taking in EU banking. The current study identifies significantly higher average turnover rates but also finds that they are driven by CEOs at poorly performing banks. Banks indemnified their executives by off-setting the bonus cap with higher fixed compensation. Although our evidence is only suggestive, we do not find any reduction in risk-taking at the bank level, one purported aim of the regulation.

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来源期刊

Journal of Accounting & Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

8.70

自引率

6.80%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Accounting and Economics encourages the application of economic theory to the explanation of accounting phenomena. It provides a forum for the publication of the highest quality manuscripts which employ economic analyses of accounting problems. A wide range of methodologies and topics are encouraged and covered: * The role of accounting within the firm; * The information content and role of accounting numbers in capital markets; * The role of accounting in financial contracts and in monitoring agency relationships; * The determination of accounting standards; * Government regulation of corporate disclosure and/or the Accounting profession; * The theory of the accounting firm.