固定收益电话会议

IF 5.4 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Gus De Franco , Thomas Shohfi , Da Xu , Zhiwei (Vivi) Zhu
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引用次数: 1

摘要

我们研究了公司固定收益电话会议的决定因素和信息作用,这是一种独特的自愿披露形式,偏离了面向所有利益相关者的传统多用途公司披露。我们发现,固定收益电话更有可能由债务较多、缺乏信用评级或拥有公开交易股权、外国或正在经历亏损的公司持有。在使用上市公司样本进行的内容分析中,我们发现,与盈利电话会议的匹配样本相比,这些电话会议在更大程度上讨论了债务-股权冲突事件,如股票回购。最后,我们记录了信贷市场对这些呼吁的反应,与为投资者提供新信息的呼吁一致。总的来说,这些结果与固定收益电话一致,满足了债务和股票投资者的不同信息需求。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Fixed income conference calls

We study the determinants and the informational role of firms' fixed income conference calls, a unique form of voluntary disclosure that deviates from the traditional multi-purpose firm disclosures intended for all stakeholders. We find that fixed income calls are more likely to be held by firms that have more debt, lack credit ratings or have publicly traded equity, are foreign, or are experiencing losses. In a content analysis using a sample of public firms, we find that these calls discuss debt-equity conflict events, such as share repurchases, to a greater degree relative to a matched sample of earnings conference calls. Finally, we document that credit markets react to these calls, consistent with the calls providing investors new information. Overall, these results are consistent with fixed income calls meeting the differential informational demands of debt versus equity investors.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
8.70
自引率
6.80%
发文量
68
期刊介绍: The Journal of Accounting and Economics encourages the application of economic theory to the explanation of accounting phenomena. It provides a forum for the publication of the highest quality manuscripts which employ economic analyses of accounting problems. A wide range of methodologies and topics are encouraged and covered: * The role of accounting within the firm; * The information content and role of accounting numbers in capital markets; * The role of accounting in financial contracts and in monitoring agency relationships; * The determination of accounting standards; * Government regulation of corporate disclosure and/or the Accounting profession; * The theory of the accounting firm.
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