在1991年至1992年被截获的塞尔维亚政治精英之间的电话会谈中建立“穆斯林国家”的过程。

Q4 Arts and Humanities
Hikmet Karčić
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引用次数: 0

摘要

1991年期间,波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那安全部门开始监测塞尔维亚民主党高级官员的电话交谈情况。这些录音对话揭示了战争准备和随后的种族灭绝的部分真相。被截获的对话还显示,波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那的塞尔维亚官员与贝尔格莱德,即斯洛博丹·米洛舍维奇和南斯拉夫领导人的其他官员有联系。这些对话一直记录到侵略开始,也就是说,直到他们于1992年3月和4月离开波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那共和国领土,电话都被窃听。本文将讨论1991年5月至1992年3月期间记录的对话。这些对话中最常见的话题之一是伊斯兰教问题,即“伊斯兰共和国”、“伊斯兰宣言”、“伊斯兰教生活方式”、“穆斯林原教旨主义”等术语的主题化。该论文展示了塞尔维亚政治精英如何使用这一术语在公众舆论中灌输恐惧,但在一定程度上,他们也认为出生率的提高将导致穆斯林占多数的国家的建立。为了撰写本文,对主要来源进行了研究,即截获的对话记录。海牙法庭检察官办公室在审判塞尔维亚高级官员期间将这些笔录用作证据。除了对记录进行研究、整理和分析外,本文还将确定塞尔维亚领导人对话中最突出的参与者。此外,鉴于上述电话谈话的私人性质的特殊性,可以剖析谈话中的重要话题,这些话题通常不是军事和政治话题,有助于找到更多的答案。这使得这些对话变得更加重要,因为它们展示了种族灭绝战略家更亲密的一面。高级官员斯洛博丹·米洛舍维奇(Slobodan Milošević)、拉多万·卡拉季奇(Radovan Karadžić。另一方面,通过对话,人们可以看到SDS领导层如何很好地管理了当地的局势。执行各种政治和社会任务的低级别人物,如SRNA主任Todor Dutin、SDS执行委员会主席Rajko Dukić和Milići的一名当地强人出现在对话中;Vojo Kuprešanin,SDS主板成员,克拉伊纳的关键人物;波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那内务部副部长Vitomiržepinić;克拉伊纳自治区负责人Radoslav Brčanin、弗拉塞尼察SDS的杰出成员Zvonko Bajagić、作家和散文家Gojkoõogo、Karadžić的密友Momčilo Momo Mandić、,波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那内务部副部长,后来成为所谓“塞尔维亚共和国”的战时司法部长“,;拉多万·卡拉季奇内阁负责人、SDS主板成员特里夫科·科马德和其他许多人。此外,值得一提的是,会谈参与者明显的‘激进化’。随着当地政治局势的恶化,仇恨言论和威胁变得更加频繁和严重并在科研工作中推广使用。随着技术和通信手段的进步,研究的主要来源正在慢慢转变,并呈现出新的面貌。因此,本文还试图分析这些被截获的对话,以深入了解理解波斯尼亚塞族领导人种族灭绝意图的复杂性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Percepcija stvaranje ‘Muslimanske države’ u presretnutim telefonskim razgovorima između srpske političke elite 1991-1992.
During 1991, the security services of Bosnia and Herzegovina began to monitor the telephone conversations of high-ranking officials of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS). These recorded conversations reveal part of the truth to the preparations for the war and the genocide that followed. Intercepted conversations also show the connections that Serbian officials in Bosnia and Herzegovina had with Belgrade, that is, with Slobodan Milošević and other officials of the Yugoslav leadership. These conversations were recorded until the beginning of the aggression, that is, until they left the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in March and April 1992, by persons whose phones were tapped. This paper will deal with conversations that were recorded in the period from May 1991 to March 1992. One of the most common topics of these conversations was the issue of Islam, that is, the thematization of terms such as „Islamic Republic“, „Islamic Declaration“, „Islamic way of life“, „Islamic fundamentalism“, etc. The paper shows how the Serbian political elite used this terminology to instill fear in public opinion, but to a certain extent they also believed that an increased birth rate would lead to the establishment of a Muslim-majority state. For the purposes of writing this paper, research was done on primary sources, i.e. transcripts of intercepted conversations. The transcripts were used as evidence by the Prosecutor's Office of the Hague Tribunal during the trial of high-ranking Serbian officials. In addition to the research, sorting and analysis of the transcripts, this paper will also identify the most prominent participants in the conversation of the Serbian leadership. Also, given the aforementioned specificity of telephone conversations through their private nature, it is possible to dissect important topics in the conversations, which are often not military and political, and will contribute to finding additional answers. This makes these conversations even more important because they show a more intimate side of the genocidal strategist. Participants such as high-ranking officials Slobodan Milošević, Radovan Karadžić, Biljana Plavšić, Nikola Koljević, Momčilo Krajišnik, Dobrica Čosić and others, shows what and how those at the top thought in their private telephone conversations in those days in 1991 and 1992. On the other hand, through the conversations, one can see how well the SDS leadership managed the situation on the ground. Low-ranking figures who performed various political and social tasks such as Todor Dutin, director of the SRNA, Rajko Dukić, president of the SDS Executive Committee and a local strongman in Milići appear in the conversations; Vojo Kuprešanin, member of the Main Board of SDS and a key man in Krajina; Vitomir Žepinić, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Radoslav Brđanin, head of the Autonomous Region of Krajina, Zvonko Bajagić, a prominent member of the SDS in Vlasenica, Gojko Đogo, writer and essayist, a close friend of Karadžić, Momčilo Momo Mandić, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina and later wartime Minister of Justice of the so-called „Republic Serbian“,; Trifko Komad, head of Radovan Karadžić's Cabinet and member of the SDS Main Board and many others. Also, what is important to mention is the visible 'radicalization' of the participants in the talks. As the political situation on the ground worsened, hate speech and threats became more frequent and serious. This paper aims to further approach this important topic of intercepted conversations and to popularize its greater use in scientific research works. With the advancement of technology and means of communication, the primary sources for research are slowly shifting and taking on a new look. Thus, this paper also tries to analyze these intercepted conversations to give some insight into the complexity of understanding the genocidal intentions of the Bosnian Serb leadership.
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来源期刊
Historijski pogledi
Historijski pogledi Arts and Humanities-History
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