杜普斯日的分析叙事

IF 1.3 4区 社会学 Q3 SOCIOLOGY
B. Crettez, Régis Deloche, Ronan Tallec
{"title":"杜普斯日的分析叙事","authors":"B. Crettez, Régis Deloche, Ronan Tallec","doi":"10.1177/10434631231194142","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"On November, 11th, 1630, Queen Marie de’ Medici demanded, in vain, that her son, King Louis XIII, dismiss Richelieu as Principal Minister. Historians agree that this crisis known as the Journée des Dupes (the Day of the Dupes) was the true foundation stone of French “absolutism”, but they disagree about whether the decision made by the Queen was rational. We analyze the historical setting of the crisis from a game theory viewpoint where the King and the Queen are two players. We consider two assumptions regarding the King and the Queen’s cognitive skills. On the one hand, we assume that both the King and the Queen are perfectly rational. On the other hand, we assume that they both have limited cognitive skills (that is, they are level-k players). In this last case we propose a definition of naivety and we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the Queen to be naive. We then study the Nash equilibrium when both the King and the Queen are perfectly rational as well as the behavioral theoretical solution of the game when they have limited cognitive skills. We rely on this study to propose an analytical narrative of the Journées des Dupes. We conclude that what we know of the historical facts does not allow us to reject the assumption that the Queen was perfectly rational, or, if she was not, that she had not been naive.","PeriodicalId":47079,"journal":{"name":"Rationality and Society","volume":"35 1","pages":"480 - 501"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3000,"publicationDate":"2023-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"An analytical narrative of the Day of Dupes\",\"authors\":\"B. Crettez, Régis Deloche, Ronan Tallec\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/10434631231194142\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"On November, 11th, 1630, Queen Marie de’ Medici demanded, in vain, that her son, King Louis XIII, dismiss Richelieu as Principal Minister. Historians agree that this crisis known as the Journée des Dupes (the Day of the Dupes) was the true foundation stone of French “absolutism”, but they disagree about whether the decision made by the Queen was rational. We analyze the historical setting of the crisis from a game theory viewpoint where the King and the Queen are two players. We consider two assumptions regarding the King and the Queen’s cognitive skills. On the one hand, we assume that both the King and the Queen are perfectly rational. On the other hand, we assume that they both have limited cognitive skills (that is, they are level-k players). In this last case we propose a definition of naivety and we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the Queen to be naive. We then study the Nash equilibrium when both the King and the Queen are perfectly rational as well as the behavioral theoretical solution of the game when they have limited cognitive skills. We rely on this study to propose an analytical narrative of the Journées des Dupes. We conclude that what we know of the historical facts does not allow us to reject the assumption that the Queen was perfectly rational, or, if she was not, that she had not been naive.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47079,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Rationality and Society\",\"volume\":\"35 1\",\"pages\":\"480 - 501\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-08-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Rationality and Society\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631231194142\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"SOCIOLOGY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Rationality and Society","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631231194142","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"SOCIOLOGY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

1630年11月11日,玛丽·德·美第奇女王徒劳地要求她的儿子路易十三国王解除黎塞留的首席大臣职务。历史学家一致认为,这场被称为“杜普斯日”的危机是法国“专制主义”的真正基石,但他们对女王做出的决定是否合理存在分歧。我们从博弈论的角度分析了这场危机的历史背景,国王和王后是两个参与者。我们考虑了关于国王和王后认知能力的两个假设。一方面,我们认为国王和王后都是完全理性的。另一方面,我们假设他们都有有限的认知能力(也就是说,他们是k级玩家)。在最后一种情况下,我们提出了天真的定义,并为女王天真提供了必要和充分的条件。然后,我们研究了当国王和王后都是完全理性的时候的纳什均衡,以及当他们的认知能力有限的时候的博弈行为理论解。我们依靠这项研究提出了一种对《杜普斯日记》的分析叙事。我们得出的结论是,我们对历史事实的了解不允许我们拒绝女王完全理性的假设,或者,如果她不是,她也不天真。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
An analytical narrative of the Day of Dupes
On November, 11th, 1630, Queen Marie de’ Medici demanded, in vain, that her son, King Louis XIII, dismiss Richelieu as Principal Minister. Historians agree that this crisis known as the Journée des Dupes (the Day of the Dupes) was the true foundation stone of French “absolutism”, but they disagree about whether the decision made by the Queen was rational. We analyze the historical setting of the crisis from a game theory viewpoint where the King and the Queen are two players. We consider two assumptions regarding the King and the Queen’s cognitive skills. On the one hand, we assume that both the King and the Queen are perfectly rational. On the other hand, we assume that they both have limited cognitive skills (that is, they are level-k players). In this last case we propose a definition of naivety and we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the Queen to be naive. We then study the Nash equilibrium when both the King and the Queen are perfectly rational as well as the behavioral theoretical solution of the game when they have limited cognitive skills. We rely on this study to propose an analytical narrative of the Journées des Dupes. We conclude that what we know of the historical facts does not allow us to reject the assumption that the Queen was perfectly rational, or, if she was not, that she had not been naive.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
1.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
21
期刊介绍: Rationality & Society focuses on the growing contributions of rational-action based theory, and the questions and controversies surrounding this growth. Why Choose Rationality and Society? The trend toward ever-greater specialization in many areas of intellectual life has lead to fragmentation that deprives scholars of the ability to communicate even in closely adjoining fields. The emergence of the rational action paradigm as the inter-lingua of the social sciences is a remarkable exception to this trend. It is the one paradigm that offers the promise of bringing greater theoretical unity across disciplines such as economics, sociology, political science, cognitive psychology, moral philosophy and law.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信