政治竞争与司法独立:立法机构失效时法院如何填补空白

IF 0.8 Q2 LAW
Joshua Boston, David Carlson, JBrandon Duck-Mayr, Greg Sasso
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引用次数: 0

摘要

政治竞争对产生事实上的司法独立有什么影响?我们认为,立法机构中的竞争可以推动事实上的司法独立性的提高。我们的博弈论模型表明,无论政府更替概率如何,席位竞争的加剧都会阻碍立法者制定其政纲的能力,而立法细分的增加也使法院干预的可能性更大。利用民主国家的样本,经验证据表明,当一个国家的立法机构在政党之间日益分裂或席位更替不断增加时,我们观察到事实上的独立性会增加。这项研究为独立与竞争之间的联系提供了新的视角。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Political Competition and Judicial Independence: How Courts Fill the Void When Legislatures Are Ineffective
What effect does political competition have in generating de facto judicial independence? We argue that competition in a legislature can drive increases in de facto judicial independence. Our game-theoretic model reveals that increased competition for seats impedes legislators’ ability to enact their platforms, regardless of government turnover probability, and increased legislative fractionalization also makes court intervention more likely. Utilizing a sample of democratic states, empirical evidence suggests when a country’s legislature is increasingly fractionalized among parties or has increasing seat turnover, we observe increases in de facto independence. This research provides new perspectives on the link between independence and competition.
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CiteScore
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