中国特色特惠

IF 7.5 1区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Nber Macroeconomics Annual Pub Date : 2019-05-01 DOI:10.1086/707189

C. Bai, Chang-tai Hsieh, Zheng Song

{"title":"中国特色特惠","authors":"C. Bai, Chang-tai Hsieh, Zheng Song","doi":"10.1086/707189","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Chinese local governments wield their enormous political power and administrative capacity to provide “special deals” for favored private firms. We argue that China’s extraordinary economic growth comes from these special deals. Local political leaders do so because they derive personal benefits, either political or monetary, from providing special deals. Competition between local governments limits the predatory effects of special deals.","PeriodicalId":51680,"journal":{"name":"Nber Macroeconomics Annual","volume":"34 1","pages":"341 - 379"},"PeriodicalIF":7.5000,"publicationDate":"2019-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1086/707189","citationCount":"89","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Special Deals with Chinese Characteristics\",\"authors\":\"C. Bai, Chang-tai Hsieh, Zheng Song\",\"doi\":\"10.1086/707189\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Chinese local governments wield their enormous political power and administrative capacity to provide “special deals” for favored private firms. We argue that China’s extraordinary economic growth comes from these special deals. Local political leaders do so because they derive personal benefits, either political or monetary, from providing special deals. Competition between local governments limits the predatory effects of special deals.\",\"PeriodicalId\":51680,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Nber Macroeconomics Annual\",\"volume\":\"34 1\",\"pages\":\"341 - 379\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":7.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-05-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1086/707189\",\"citationCount\":\"89\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Nber Macroeconomics Annual\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1086/707189\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Nber Macroeconomics Annual","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1086/707189","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 89

摘要

中国地方政府行使其巨大的政治权力和行政能力，为受青睐的私营企业提供“特殊交易”。我们认为，中国非凡的经济增长来自于这些特殊交易。地方政治领导人这样做是因为他们从提供特殊交易中获得政治或货币方面的个人利益。地方政府之间的竞争限制了特殊交易的掠夺性影响。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Special Deals with Chinese Characteristics

Chinese local governments wield their enormous political power and administrative capacity to provide “special deals” for favored private firms. We argue that China’s extraordinary economic growth comes from these special deals. Local political leaders do so because they derive personal benefits, either political or monetary, from providing special deals. Competition between local governments limits the predatory effects of special deals.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Nber Macroeconomics Annual ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

5.10

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Nber Macroeconomics Annual provides a forum for important debates in contemporary macroeconomics and major developments in the theory of macroeconomic analysis and policy that include leading economists from a variety of fields.