{"title":"单一监督机制框架中的问责差距","authors":"A. Karagianni, M. Scholten","doi":"10.5334/UJIEL.463","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The first judgement of the General Court (EU) pertaining to the Single Supervision Mechanism (SSM) raised an issue concerning the source of the shared supervisory powers in the system of EU prudential supervision. In the General Court’s view, the SSM Regulation conferred on the European Central Bank (ECB) exclusive powers to carry out specific prudential supervisory tasks vis-a-vis all euro area credit institutions (significant and less significant). At the same time, the ECB’s national counterparts assist the former in implementing its supervisory tasks vis-a-vis less significant credit institutions. We argue that such a scheme requires a clear accountability relationship also between the ECB and the national competent authorities (NCAs), something that is not fully fledged in the current legal framework.","PeriodicalId":30606,"journal":{"name":"Utrecht Journal of International and European Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2018-11-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Accountability Gaps in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) Framework\",\"authors\":\"A. Karagianni, M. Scholten\",\"doi\":\"10.5334/UJIEL.463\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The first judgement of the General Court (EU) pertaining to the Single Supervision Mechanism (SSM) raised an issue concerning the source of the shared supervisory powers in the system of EU prudential supervision. In the General Court’s view, the SSM Regulation conferred on the European Central Bank (ECB) exclusive powers to carry out specific prudential supervisory tasks vis-a-vis all euro area credit institutions (significant and less significant). At the same time, the ECB’s national counterparts assist the former in implementing its supervisory tasks vis-a-vis less significant credit institutions. We argue that such a scheme requires a clear accountability relationship also between the ECB and the national competent authorities (NCAs), something that is not fully fledged in the current legal framework.\",\"PeriodicalId\":30606,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Utrecht Journal of International and European Law\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-11-22\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"5\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Utrecht Journal of International and European Law\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5334/UJIEL.463\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Utrecht Journal of International and European Law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5334/UJIEL.463","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Accountability Gaps in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) Framework
The first judgement of the General Court (EU) pertaining to the Single Supervision Mechanism (SSM) raised an issue concerning the source of the shared supervisory powers in the system of EU prudential supervision. In the General Court’s view, the SSM Regulation conferred on the European Central Bank (ECB) exclusive powers to carry out specific prudential supervisory tasks vis-a-vis all euro area credit institutions (significant and less significant). At the same time, the ECB’s national counterparts assist the former in implementing its supervisory tasks vis-a-vis less significant credit institutions. We argue that such a scheme requires a clear accountability relationship also between the ECB and the national competent authorities (NCAs), something that is not fully fledged in the current legal framework.