单一监督机制框架中的问责差距

IF 0.3 Q4 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
A. Karagianni, M. Scholten
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引用次数: 5

摘要

普通法院(欧盟)关于单一监督机制的第一项判决提出了一个关于欧盟审慎监督制度中共享监督权力来源的问题。普通法院认为,《单一监管机制条例》赋予欧洲央行(ECB)对所有欧元区信贷机构(重要和次要)执行特定审慎监管任务的专属权力。与此同时,欧洲央行的国家同行协助前者执行其对不太重要的信贷机构的监管任务。我们认为,这样的计划还需要欧洲央行和国家主管当局(NCA)之间建立明确的问责关系,而这在当前的法律框架中还没有完全成熟。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Accountability Gaps in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) Framework
The first judgement of the General Court (EU) pertaining to the Single Supervision Mechanism (SSM) raised an issue concerning the source of the shared supervisory powers in the system of EU prudential supervision. In the General Court’s view, the SSM Regulation conferred on the European Central Bank (ECB) exclusive powers to carry out specific prudential supervisory tasks vis-a-vis all euro area credit institutions (significant and less significant). At the same time, the ECB’s national counterparts assist the former in implementing its supervisory tasks vis-a-vis less significant credit institutions. We argue that such a scheme requires a clear accountability relationship also between the ECB and the national competent authorities (NCAs), something that is not fully fledged in the current legal framework.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.00
自引率
0.00%
发文量
2
审稿时长
11 weeks
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