{"title":"《合同法》的红线:暴露“意图”作为对价的指南","authors":"L. Goldfarb","doi":"10.5206/uwojls.v14i1.15360","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper describes and evaluates the contested fourth requirement for contract formation: the intention of both parties that their agreement be legally enforceable (“legal intention”). I begin with an overview of the jurisprudence on legal intention, ending with the Supreme Court of Canada’s most recent pronouncement in Ethiopian Orthodox Church of Canada St. Mary Cathedral v Aga. While the Court in this case affirmed that legal intention is to be treated as a fourth requirement, its analysis reveals precisely the reason why it should not be: when courts purport to analyze legal intention, an inherently difficult value to assess, they often lapse into a veiled assessment of consideration instead. I draw on Peter Benson's conception of \"robust consideration\" to argue that we should dispense with the legal intention requirement. In its place, a clear test for robust consideration would allow courts to conduct self-aware analyses free from contorted intention assessments. I conclude by offering an interpretation of Balfour v Balfour, the seminar case supporting a legal intention requirement, that is consistent with my proposed approach to contract formation. ","PeriodicalId":40917,"journal":{"name":"Western Journal of Legal Studies","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Contract Law’s Red Herring: Exposing “Intention” as a Guise for Consideration\",\"authors\":\"L. Goldfarb\",\"doi\":\"10.5206/uwojls.v14i1.15360\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper describes and evaluates the contested fourth requirement for contract formation: the intention of both parties that their agreement be legally enforceable (“legal intention”). I begin with an overview of the jurisprudence on legal intention, ending with the Supreme Court of Canada’s most recent pronouncement in Ethiopian Orthodox Church of Canada St. Mary Cathedral v Aga. While the Court in this case affirmed that legal intention is to be treated as a fourth requirement, its analysis reveals precisely the reason why it should not be: when courts purport to analyze legal intention, an inherently difficult value to assess, they often lapse into a veiled assessment of consideration instead. I draw on Peter Benson's conception of \\\"robust consideration\\\" to argue that we should dispense with the legal intention requirement. In its place, a clear test for robust consideration would allow courts to conduct self-aware analyses free from contorted intention assessments. I conclude by offering an interpretation of Balfour v Balfour, the seminar case supporting a legal intention requirement, that is consistent with my proposed approach to contract formation. \",\"PeriodicalId\":40917,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Western Journal of Legal Studies\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-01-31\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Western Journal of Legal Studies\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5206/uwojls.v14i1.15360\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Western Journal of Legal Studies","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5206/uwojls.v14i1.15360","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
Contract Law’s Red Herring: Exposing “Intention” as a Guise for Consideration
This paper describes and evaluates the contested fourth requirement for contract formation: the intention of both parties that their agreement be legally enforceable (“legal intention”). I begin with an overview of the jurisprudence on legal intention, ending with the Supreme Court of Canada’s most recent pronouncement in Ethiopian Orthodox Church of Canada St. Mary Cathedral v Aga. While the Court in this case affirmed that legal intention is to be treated as a fourth requirement, its analysis reveals precisely the reason why it should not be: when courts purport to analyze legal intention, an inherently difficult value to assess, they often lapse into a veiled assessment of consideration instead. I draw on Peter Benson's conception of "robust consideration" to argue that we should dispense with the legal intention requirement. In its place, a clear test for robust consideration would allow courts to conduct self-aware analyses free from contorted intention assessments. I conclude by offering an interpretation of Balfour v Balfour, the seminar case supporting a legal intention requirement, that is consistent with my proposed approach to contract formation.