当透明度失效：对印尼当地银行代理人的金融激励

IF 7.6 1区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Review of Economics and Statistics Pub Date : 2023-07-24 DOI:10.1162/rest_a_01359

Erika Deserranno, Gianmarco León-Ciliotta, Firman Witoelar

{"title":"当透明度失效：对印尼当地银行代理人的金融激励","authors":"Erika Deserranno, Gianmarco León-Ciliotta, Firman Witoelar","doi":"10.1162/rest_a_01359","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n We study the effect of raising the level and transparency of financial incentives offered to local agents for acquiring clients of a new banking product on take-up. We find that paying agents higher incentives increases take-up and usage, but only when the incentives are unknown to prospective clients. When disclosed, higher incentives have no effect on take-up and usage, despite greater agent effort. This is due to the financial incentives sending a negative signal to potential clients about the reliability and trustworthiness of the product. Hence, when designing incentives, organizations should consider both their level and transparency.","PeriodicalId":48456,"journal":{"name":"Review of Economics and Statistics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":7.6000,"publicationDate":"2023-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"When Transparency Fails: Financial Incentives for Local Banking Agents in Indonesia\",\"authors\":\"Erika Deserranno, Gianmarco León-Ciliotta, Firman Witoelar\",\"doi\":\"10.1162/rest_a_01359\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n We study the effect of raising the level and transparency of financial incentives offered to local agents for acquiring clients of a new banking product on take-up. We find that paying agents higher incentives increases take-up and usage, but only when the incentives are unknown to prospective clients. When disclosed, higher incentives have no effect on take-up and usage, despite greater agent effort. This is due to the financial incentives sending a negative signal to potential clients about the reliability and trustworthiness of the product. Hence, when designing incentives, organizations should consider both their level and transparency.\",\"PeriodicalId\":48456,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Review of Economics and Statistics\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":7.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-07-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Review of Economics and Statistics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01359\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Review of Economics and Statistics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01359","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

摘要

我们研究了提高向当地代理商提供的金融激励水平和透明度，以获取新银行产品的客户对接受率的影响。我们发现，向代理商支付更高的激励措施会增加使用率和使用率，但只有在潜在客户不知道激励措施的情况下。当披露时，尽管代理人付出了更大的努力，但更高的激励措施对接受和使用没有影响。这是由于经济激励向潜在客户发出了关于产品可靠性和可信度的负面信号。因此，在设计激励措施时，各组织应考虑其水平和透明度。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

When Transparency Fails: Financial Incentives for Local Banking Agents in Indonesia

We study the effect of raising the level and transparency of financial incentives offered to local agents for acquiring clients of a new banking product on take-up. We find that paying agents higher incentives increases take-up and usage, but only when the incentives are unknown to prospective clients. When disclosed, higher incentives have no effect on take-up and usage, despite greater agent effort. This is due to the financial incentives sending a negative signal to potential clients about the reliability and trustworthiness of the product. Hence, when designing incentives, organizations should consider both their level and transparency.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Review of Economics and Statistics Multiple-

CiteScore

8.50

自引率

0.00%

发文量

175

期刊介绍： The Review of Economics and Statistics is a 100-year-old general journal of applied (especially quantitative) economics. Edited at the Harvard Kennedy School, the Review has published some of the most important articles in empirical economics.