俄罗斯政治体制:灵活性测试

S. Ryzhenkov
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在弗拉基米尔·普京统治下的过去20年里,他的亲密圈子和他在各级政府中的大量支持者为如何利用公共和私人资源以及选举威权主义的制度特征提供了一个有指导意义的例子。尽管2011年和2012年发生了政治危机,但我们不能说这个政权在其存在的20年中经历了严重困难或面临危险挑战。无论反对派宣传人员多么关注危机迹象,现在都很难同意他们的观点:在为2021年议会选举,最重要的是2024年总统选举做准备的过程中,该政权正在积极而灵活地应对该国政治,特别是选举局势的变化,这标志着普京在宪法规定的“连续两届任期”中的第二届任期结束。当然,问题不在于政权中的人物对专家们在选举威权主义方面的工作进行了彻底的研究,也不在于他们与专家们进行了协商,而反对派则没有。他们只是机会主义和狡猾地寻求和寻找在不断变化的环境中应用“规则对规则”的更新方法。他们的努力形成了一种制度化的个人选举独裁政权。如果取消选举、实行一党制甚至建立军事独裁更有利可图,那么相应的政治制度将是他们活动的副作用。对国家资源的控制是无休止延长统治的基本条件。尽管执政集团和政府内部的各种利益以及协调问题造成了一些孤立的问题,但与其他政治团体相比,资源上的巨大优势给了该政权纠正错误的机会:它所要做的就是避免关键的战略误判——其他一切都可以纠正。原则上
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Russian Political Regime: A Flexibility Test
The past 20 years under the rule of Vladimir Putin, his close circle, and his enormous number of supporters at all levels of the government provide an instructive example of how to take advantage of public and private resources and the institutional characteristics of electoral authoritarianism. In spite of the political crisis of 2011 and 2012, we cannot say that this regime has experienced serious difficulties or faced dangerous challenges over the 20 years of its existence. And no matter how much opposition publicists are focusing on signs of a crisis, it’s hard to agree with them right now: The regime is actively and quite flexibly reacting to changes in the political and, specifically, electoral situation in the country as it prepares for the 2021 parliamentary elections and, most importantly, the 2024 presidential election, which marks the end of Putin’s second of “two terms in a row” enshrined in the Constitution. The problem, of course, is not that figures in the regime have made a thorough study of specialists’ work on electoral authoritarianism or that they consult with them, while the opposition does not. They are merely opportunistically and deviously seeking and finding newer and newer ways to apply “rules to rule by” in changing circumstances. Their efforts have taken the shape of an institutionalized form of a personalist electoral authoritarian regime. If it were more profitable to cancel the elections, or introduce (one-)party rule, or even establish a military dictatorship, then the corresponding political system would be the side effect of their activities. Control over state resources is the basic condition for endlessly prolonging rule. Even though there have been isolated glitches caused by assorted interests within the ruling group and the government and problems with coordination, a huge advantage in resources over other political groups has given the regime the chance to fix its errors: All it has to do is avoid critical strategic miscalculations—everything else can be fixed. In principle, the
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