参议院司法委员会与联邦法院的关系

IF 0.2 Q4 LAW
Mark C. Miller
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引用次数: 1

摘要

摘要本文通过历史制度主义分析,探讨了参议院司法委员会和联邦法院之间的一般关系。参议院司法委员会,通常被称为“律师委员会”,采用了一种非常像律师的决策过程和风格。本条考虑了大量律师是否有助于保护联邦法院免受体制攻击;它探讨了委员会如何影响任何特定联邦法院的法官人数,并帮助确定美国巡回上诉法院的边界。这篇文章探讨了为什么参议院司法委员会经常成为众议院司法委员会甚至整个众议院批准的法院限制提案的墓地。该条款的主要重点是委员会主席如何对法院与国会的关系产生相当大的影响,尽管主席必须在整个参议院的整体决策文化中发挥作用。它指出,不同的主席对司法提名人的蓝名单程序的处理方式非常不同,部分取决于白宫和参议院是否由同一政党控制。最后,文章讨论了委员会如何吸引两党意识形态极端的成员,以及这种意识形态两极分化如何影响委员会与联邦司法机构的互动。该条款还就这些问题与众议院司法委员会进行了一些比较。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Senate Judiciary Committee's Relationship with the Federal Courts
Abstract This Article examines the general relationship between the Senate Judiciary Committee and the federal courts using a historical institutionalist analysis. The Senate Judiciary Committee, often known as the “Committee of Lawyers”, has adopted a very lawyer-like decision making process and style. This Article considers whether the large number of lawyers who sit on it serves to protect the federal courts from institutional attacks; it explores how the Committee can influence the number of judges sitting on any given federal court and help determine the boundaries of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals. The Article explores why the Senate Judiciary Committee often serves as a graveyard for court-curbing proposals approved by the House Judiciary Committee or even the full House. The main focus of the Article is on how the Committee chair has considerable influence on the court-Congress relationship, although the chair must function within the overall decision-making culture of the Senate as a whole. It notes various chairs have approached the Blue Slip process for judicial nominees very differently, depending in part on whether the White House and the Senate are controlled by the same political party. Finally, the Article discusses how the Committee attracts ideologically extreme members of both parties and how this ideological polarization affects the Committee's interactions with the federal judiciary. The Article also provides some comparisons with the House Judiciary Committee on these issues.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
6
审稿时长
18 weeks
期刊介绍: The British Journal of American Legal Studies is a scholarly journal which publishes articles of interest to the Anglo-American legal community. Submissions are invited from academics and practitioners on both sides of the Atlantic on all aspects of constitutional law having relevance to the United States, including human rights, legal and political theory, socio-legal studies and legal history. International, comparative and interdisciplinary perspectives are particularly welcome. All submissions will be peer-refereed through anonymous referee processes.
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