归纳、理性与现实主义/反现实主义之争:对谢赫的回答

IF 0.7 2区 哲学 Q2 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
K. Wray
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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要Shech(2022)对我在《抵制科学现实主义》中提出的反现实主义辩护进行了批判性评估。归纳和归纳推理在谢对我的现实主义辩护的批判性分析中起着核心作用。我认为,谢奇关于归纳和归纳推理的批评是有问题的,并不威胁我对反现实主义的辩护。与Shech所声称的相反,反现实主义者不需要解释为什么归纳推理是成功的。这不是当代现实主义/反现实主义辩论的一部分。此外,这样的要求并没有认识到一些反现实主义者对归纳法没有太多的重视。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Induction, Rationality, and the Realism/Anti-realism Debate: A Reply to Shech
ABSTRACT Shech (2022) offers a critical assessment of my defense of anti-realism, developed in Resisting Scientific Realism. Induction and inductive inferences play a central role in Shech’s critical analysis of my defense of realism. I argue that Shech’s criticisms that relate to induction and inductive inference are problematic, and do not constitute a threat to my defense of anti-realism. Contrary to what Shech claims, the anti-realist does not need to explain why inductive inferences are successful. That is not part of contemporary realism/anti-realism debate. Further, such a demand fails to recognise that some anti-realists do not put much stock in induction.
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来源期刊
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE-
自引率
12.50%
发文量
10
期刊介绍: International Studies in the Philosophy of Science is a scholarly journal dedicated to publishing original research in philosophy of science and in philosophically informed history and sociology of science. Its scope includes the foundations and methodology of the natural, social, and human sciences, philosophical implications of particular scientific theories, and broader philosophical reflection on science. The editors invite contributions not only from philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science, but also from researchers in the sciences. The journal publishes articles from a wide variety of countries and philosophical traditions.
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