考虑绿色效应的古诺寡头垄断微分博弈模型

IF 0.6 Q4 ECONOMICS

Games Pub Date : 2023-01-30 DOI:10.3390/g14010014

G. Ougolnitsky, A. Usov

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引用次数: 2

摘要

在一般情况和对称主体情况下，我们建立了一个考虑污染的古诺寡头垄断微分博弈模型，并对其进行了分析和数值研究。我们使用相对效率的个体和集体指数对自私主体的行为（正态形式的微分对策）、他们的层次组织（微分Stackelberg对策）和合作（最优控制问题）进行了比较分析。当参与者同时选择产量和环境保护措施时，对具有绿色效应的模型进行了同样的分析。我们使用庞特里亚金最大值原理进行分析研究，并在数值计算的模拟建模中使用定性代表性场景的方法。这种方法可以减少计算机模拟的次数，提供足够的精度。通过比较分析，得出了集体偏好和个人偏好的体系。

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Differential Game-Theoretic Models of Cournot Oligopoly with Consideration of the Green Effect

We built and investigated analytically and numerically a differential game model of Cournot oligopoly with consideration of pollution for the general case and the case of symmetrical agents. We conducted a comparative analysis of selfish agents’ behavior (a differential game in normal form), their hierarchical organization (differential Stackelberg games), and cooperation (optimal control problem) using individual and collective indices of relative efficiency. The same analysis wasperformed for the models with the green effect when players chose both output volumes and environmental protection efforts. We used the Pontryagin maximum principle for analytical investigation and the method of qualitatively representative scenarios in simulation modeling for numerical calculations. This method allows for reducing the number of computer simulations, providing sufficient precision. As a result of the comparative analysis, systems of collective and individual preferences were obtained.

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来源期刊

Games Decision Sciences-Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

CiteScore

1.60

自引率

11.10%

发文量

审稿时长

11 weeks

期刊介绍： Games (ISSN 2073-4336) is an international, peer-reviewed, quick-refereeing open access journal (free for readers), which provides an advanced forum for studies related to strategic interaction, game theory and its applications, and decision making. The aim is to provide an interdisciplinary forum for all behavioral sciences and related fields, including economics, psychology, political science, mathematics, computer science, and biology (including animal behavior). To guarantee a rapid refereeing and editorial process, Games follows standard publication practices in the natural sciences.