国际混合三足鼎立中的容量选择

IF 0.9 Q3 ECONOMICS
K. Ohnishi
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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要本文考虑了一个混合的三元模型,其中允许国有企业、国内劳动力管理企业和外国资本主义企业预先安装产能作为一种战略承诺手段。首先,每个公司都可以同时独立地选择自己的能力水平。没有一家公司可以减少或处置产能。其次,每个公司同时独立地选择自己的产出水平。本文给出了国际三元模型的均衡结果。我们发现,对于外国资本主义企业来说,均衡结果是不盈利的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Capacity Choice in an International Mixed Triopoly
ABSTRACT This paper considers a mixed triopoly model where a state-owned firm, a domestic labor-managed firm and a foreign capitalist firm are allowed to pre-install capacity as a strategic commitment device. First, each firm can choose its capacity level simultaneously and independently. None of the firms can reduce or dispose of capacity. Second, each firm chooses its output level simultaneously and independently. The paper presents the equilibrium outcomes of the international triopoly model. We find that the equilibrium outcomes are not profitable for the foreign capitalist firm.
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来源期刊
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC JOURNAL
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC JOURNAL Economics, Econometrics and Finance-Economics, Econometrics and Finance (all)
CiteScore
2.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
22
期刊介绍: International Economic Journal is a peer-reviewed, scholarly journal devoted to publishing high-quality papers and sharing original economics research worldwide. We invite theoretical and empirical papers in the broadly-defined development and international economics areas. Papers in other sub-disciplines of economics (e.g., labor, public, money, macro, industrial organizations, health, environment and history) are also welcome if they contain international or cross-national dimensions in their scope and/or implications.
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