企业困境过程中管理层权力与ceo薪酬的动态关系:1992 - 2019年的证据

IF 2.9 3区经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Financial Management Pub Date : 2021-11-11 DOI:10.1111/fima.12384

Sheng Guo, Qiang Kang, Oscar A. Mitnik

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了1992-2019年陷入困境的公司中两种治理结构的动态，即管理层对董事会的影响和首席执行官薪酬。数据显示，随着时间的推移，治理有明显的改善趋势，这混淆了关于困境对治理影响的推断。用偏差校正匹配估计器控制长期变化，我们发现陷入困境的公司减少了管理委员会的任命和首席执行官的薪酬，加强了管理激励的一致性，并增加了首席执行官更替率。陷入困境的公司CEO薪酬的大部分变化来自薪酬中与业绩相关的部分，这与CEO薪酬的“股东价值”观点一致。JEL分类：G33、G34、J33、J44、M50

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Dynamics of managerial power and CEO compensation in the course of corporate distress: Evidence from 1992 to 2019

We study the dynamics of two governance constructs, managerial influence over the board of directors and chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, in firms undergoing distress during 1992–2019. Data show a clear trend that governance improves over time, which confounds the inference about the effects of distress on governance. Controlling for the secular changes with a bias-corrected matching estimator, we find that distressed firms reduce managerial board appointments and CEO pay, intensify managerial incentive alignment, and increase CEO turnover. The bulk of CEO compensation changes in distressed firms derives from the performance-related part of compensation, consistent with the “shareholder value” view of CEO compensation.

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来源期刊

Financial Management BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

6.00

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Financial Management (FM) serves both academics and practitioners concerned with the financial management of nonfinancial businesses, financial institutions, and public or private not-for-profit organizations.