在新冠疫情和乌克兰战争之后,欧盟的财政主权

IF 2.2 1区 社会学 Q1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Tiziano Zgaga
{"title":"在新冠疫情和乌克兰战争之后,欧盟的财政主权","authors":"Tiziano Zgaga","doi":"10.1080/07036337.2023.2210967","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT NextGenerationEU, the recovery programme adopted during the COVID-19 pandemic, did not provide the EU with fiscal sovereignty. Fiscal sovereignty remains under the control of the member states which are, however, constrained by the Stability and Growth Pact. Comparative federalism shows that central fiscal sovereignty requires granting the power to tax to the centre but without impairing the fiscal sovereignty of the units. The co-existence of two distinct, yet connected, fiscal sovereignties (EU and member states) would mean departing from the regulatory model of fiscal integration created with the Maastricht Treaty, and would thus require treaty change. Future research should perform a more thorough comparison between the EU and fiscally centralized and decentralized federations. Qualitative comparative analysis could complement process tracing and systematic content analysis to identify combinations of conditions that make the co-existence of fiscal sovereignties possible in consolidated federal polities – and still impossible in the EU. Books reviewed Paul Dermine (2022) The New Economic Governance of the Eurozone. A Rule of Law Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Federico Fabbrini (2022) EU Fiscal Capacity. Legal Integration After COVID-19 and the War in Ukraine. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Brady Gordon (2022) The Constitutional Boundaries of European Fiscal Federalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tomasz P. Woźniakowski (2022) Fiscal Unions. Economic Integration in Europe and the United States. Oxford: Oxford University Press.","PeriodicalId":47516,"journal":{"name":"Journal of European Integration","volume":"45 1","pages":"703 - 709"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2000,"publicationDate":"2023-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The fiscal sovereignty of the European Union after the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine\",\"authors\":\"Tiziano Zgaga\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/07036337.2023.2210967\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"ABSTRACT NextGenerationEU, the recovery programme adopted during the COVID-19 pandemic, did not provide the EU with fiscal sovereignty. Fiscal sovereignty remains under the control of the member states which are, however, constrained by the Stability and Growth Pact. Comparative federalism shows that central fiscal sovereignty requires granting the power to tax to the centre but without impairing the fiscal sovereignty of the units. The co-existence of two distinct, yet connected, fiscal sovereignties (EU and member states) would mean departing from the regulatory model of fiscal integration created with the Maastricht Treaty, and would thus require treaty change. Future research should perform a more thorough comparison between the EU and fiscally centralized and decentralized federations. Qualitative comparative analysis could complement process tracing and systematic content analysis to identify combinations of conditions that make the co-existence of fiscal sovereignties possible in consolidated federal polities – and still impossible in the EU. Books reviewed Paul Dermine (2022) The New Economic Governance of the Eurozone. A Rule of Law Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Federico Fabbrini (2022) EU Fiscal Capacity. Legal Integration After COVID-19 and the War in Ukraine. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Brady Gordon (2022) The Constitutional Boundaries of European Fiscal Federalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tomasz P. Woźniakowski (2022) Fiscal Unions. Economic Integration in Europe and the United States. Oxford: Oxford University Press.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47516,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of European Integration\",\"volume\":\"45 1\",\"pages\":\"703 - 709\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-05-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"4\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of European Integration\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2023.2210967\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of European Integration","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2023.2210967","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4

摘要

摘要NextGenerationEU是新冠肺炎大流行期间通过的复苏计划,没有为欧盟提供财政主权。财政主权仍在成员国的控制之下,但这些国家受到《稳定与增长公约》的限制。比较联邦制表明,中央财政主权要求授予中央征税权,但不损害各单位的财政主权。两个不同但相互关联的财政主权(欧盟和成员国)的共存将意味着偏离《马斯特里赫特条约》建立的财政一体化监管模式,因此需要修改条约。未来的研究应该对欧盟与财政集中和分散的联合会进行更彻底的比较。定性比较分析可以补充过程追踪和系统内容分析,以确定使财政主权在统一的联邦政治中共存成为可能的条件组合,而在欧盟仍然不可能。Paul Dermine(2022)《欧元区的新经济治理》书评。法治分析。剑桥:剑桥大学出版社。Federico Fabbrini(2022)欧盟财政能力。新冠肺炎和乌克兰战争后的法律整合。牛津:牛津大学出版社。布雷迪·戈登(2022)《欧洲财政联邦制的宪法边界》。剑桥:剑桥大学出版社。Tomasz P.Wo Roz niakowski(2022)财政联盟。欧洲和美国的经济一体化。牛津:牛津大学出版社。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The fiscal sovereignty of the European Union after the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine
ABSTRACT NextGenerationEU, the recovery programme adopted during the COVID-19 pandemic, did not provide the EU with fiscal sovereignty. Fiscal sovereignty remains under the control of the member states which are, however, constrained by the Stability and Growth Pact. Comparative federalism shows that central fiscal sovereignty requires granting the power to tax to the centre but without impairing the fiscal sovereignty of the units. The co-existence of two distinct, yet connected, fiscal sovereignties (EU and member states) would mean departing from the regulatory model of fiscal integration created with the Maastricht Treaty, and would thus require treaty change. Future research should perform a more thorough comparison between the EU and fiscally centralized and decentralized federations. Qualitative comparative analysis could complement process tracing and systematic content analysis to identify combinations of conditions that make the co-existence of fiscal sovereignties possible in consolidated federal polities – and still impossible in the EU. Books reviewed Paul Dermine (2022) The New Economic Governance of the Eurozone. A Rule of Law Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Federico Fabbrini (2022) EU Fiscal Capacity. Legal Integration After COVID-19 and the War in Ukraine. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Brady Gordon (2022) The Constitutional Boundaries of European Fiscal Federalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tomasz P. Woźniakowski (2022) Fiscal Unions. Economic Integration in Europe and the United States. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
6.40
自引率
6.90%
发文量
52
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信