社会性与最小自我——论丹·扎哈维的“群体认同、集体主义和视角自主”

IF 0.8 3区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-08-30 DOI:10.1111/sjp.12532

Matt E. M. Bower

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我提出并批判性地审视了Dan Zahavi的观点，即最低限度的自我和自我意识本身并不具有社会特征。我认为，扎哈维将最起码的自我从根本上说是非社会性的，这使得人们很难理解自我的统一，这在一定程度上是由于对自我社会化可能意味着什么的概念过于狭隘。

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Sociality and the minimal self: On Dan Zahavi’s “group‐identification, collectivism, and perspectival autonomy”

I present and critically examine Dan Zahavi's view that minimal selfhood and self‐awareness per se do not have a social character. I argue that Zahavi's conception of the minimal self as fundamentally asocial makes it hard to comprehend the unity of the self and that it is partly the result of an overly narrow conception of what it might mean for the self to be social.

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来源期刊

SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

1.20

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Southern Journal of Philosophy has long provided a forum for the expression of philosophical ideas and welcome articles written from all philosophical perspectives, including both the analytic and continental traditions, as well as the history of philosophy. This commitment to philosophical pluralism is reflected in the long list of notable figures whose work has appeared in the journal, including Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hubert Dreyfus, George Santayana, Wilfrid Sellars, and Richard Sorabji.