Foreword

I welcome the initiative and its results to flesh out extensions to the original (and growing) theory of ripeness. A good theory, at least in social science, does not stand unchanged like an obelisk for all to admire, but rather grows like a tree out of the original string stem. These branches give further life to the trunk and spread its shadow over broader and broader terrain. To work in reverse, a frequent criticism of ‘mere’ history is that it has plenty of leaves but needs conceptual branches and finally a mainstem to give the events meaning and direction. Together they give the theory increased coverage and relevance. Of course, further research may discover warts in the tree, weak branches even hollowness in the trunk. The name of the scientific game is to meet such criticisms, fold them into the theory, disprove them, recognize their weakening or invalidating effect, or join in reframing the problem and planting a different kind of tree. The contributions spelled out here do not fall within the latter types but rather join in a strengthening exercise, above all by filling in absent branches not involved in the original formulation. Ripeness theory only identified the necessary and sufficient conditions for negotiations to begin, or, as Kuperman (2021) nicely reverses it, without which negotiations cannot begin. The core condition, the Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS), is a concept and concepts are square with sharp angles. But reality is not square, and so the analysis of conditions that surround the concepts is important. The article by Matesan (2021), like that of Stichter (2021), examines conditions—proscribing, ceasefires—that help or hinder the establishment of a Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS). Similarly, the question of agency can stand elaboration. The concept assumes that it is the negotiator who needs to feel or perceive the MHS and associated concept, the Wat Out (WO) but the actor is a multiple agent in reality (as Stedman earlier showed). Sisk, (2021) picks up Stedmen’s discussion to show that internal conflicts, which attract international sponsors and patrons, are extremely difficult to ripen because of the number and distance of the sponsors, as I discuss also in Syria (Hinnebusch & Zartman 2016) The role of a mediator, another actor in ripeness and ripening, is important to the operation of the theory; Kuperman’s Ethnopolitics, 2022 Vol. 21, No. 2, 123–124, https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2022.2004771