更安全的捕获?渔业管理在捕鱼安全中的作用

IF 2 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Marine Resource Economics Pub Date : 2021-12-03 DOI:10.1086/716856

Lisa Pfeiffer, Tess Petesch, Thamanna Vasan

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引用次数: 6

摘要

商业渔民经常面临许多风险因素，这使其成为一种危险的职业。限制准入和渔获量的渔业管理可能会产生众所周知的种群和捕获规则外部性，即“捕鱼竞赛”。这种市场失灵会消耗租金，并可能导致渔民承担额外的风险，如在恶劣天气下捕鱼、船只超载或延迟维护以击败其他人。基于权利的管理有望减少承担额外风险的动机。使用美国各地渔民的大型数据集，我们实证估计了个人捕鱼配额（IFQ）计划对一个重要风险因素的影响：在恶劣天气下捕鱼的决定。我们发现，在IFQ下，冒险行为通常会减少，但这种转变的程度因渔业以及探索这些差异的潜在驱动因素而异。

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A Safer Catch? The Role of Fisheries Management in Fishing Safety

Commercial fishers are constantly exposed to many risk factors, making it a dangerous occupation. Fisheries management that limits access and catches can give rise to well-known stock and rule-of-capture externalities knownas the “race tofish.”Thismarket failuredissipates rents andcan leadfishers to takeonadditional risks such as fishing in poor weather, overloading vessels, or delaying maintenance to outcompete others. Rights-based management is expected to reduce the incentives to take on additional risk. Using a large dataset of fishers from around the United States, we empirically estimate the effects of individual fishing quota (IFQ) programs on one important risk factor: the decision to fish in poor weather. We find that risk-taking behavior generally decreases under IFQs, but themagnitudeof the shift differs by fishery, andweexplore potential drivers of these differences.

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来源期刊

Marine Resource Economics 农林科学-渔业

CiteScore

4.30

自引率

10.30%

发文量

审稿时长

>12 weeks

期刊介绍： Marine Resource Economics (MRE) publishes creative and scholarly economic analyses of a range of issues related to natural resource use in the global marine environment. The scope of the journal includes conceptual and empirical investigations aimed at addressing real-world oceans and coastal policy problems. Examples include studies of fisheries, aquaculture, seafood marketing and trade, marine biodiversity, marine and coastal recreation, marine pollution, offshore oil and gas, seabed mining, renewable ocean energy sources, marine transportation, coastal land use and climate adaptation, and management of estuaries and watersheds.