A Jurisprudential Attempt at Rule of Law Creation: An Analysis of Theoretical Assumptions for Compulsory International Adjudication and Realistic Challenges

The concept of the rule of law, at least as understood in the discourse on national law, includes the element of compulsory adjudication. At the same time the formulated norm on universal compulsory adjudication is missing in general international law, as well as in the particular regional order regulating relations of European states. Although this gap between the concept and practice could be perceived as an intriguing theoretical and practical problem which attracts thoughtful analysis, this is not the case in contemporary debates. In the practical discourse on the development of general international law there has been no progress regarding the implementation of the concept for centuries. The progress of the European order, even if it manifests signs of an emerging norm on compulsory international adjudication, still has to be confirmed by formulated norms. The reluctance to resolve this gap between the concept and practice causes practical problems e.g., tensions between states. In the theoretical discourse the problem already exists by the very fact of insufficient scientific attention given to this problem. The central issue for a consistent legal theory is the explanation of international law without compulsory adjudication. The purpose of this contribution is to analyse the arguments in favour of compulsory adjudication in international law. The arguments are presented by following the insights on this issue provided by Kelsen and Lauterpacht. Theoretical questions to be answered are the following: a) what are the theoretical assumptions on which the concept of compulsory international adjudication is grounded; and b) what are the objections to these assumptions from the realistic approach to law.