相同选民的低效投票

IF 0.6 4区社会学 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE

Journal of Theoretical Politics Pub Date : 2022-03-14 DOI:10.1177/09516298221085973

Ole-Andreas Elvik Naess

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文构建了一个未来不确定的两期选举模型，每个时期的政策都由多数决定原则决定。选民的最优未来政策考虑了所有可能的未来实现，而未来关键中位数选民只关心未来分布的中位数。这种动态的利益冲突意味着，即使在所有选民都相同并且对未来有相同信念的情况下，选举结果也可能严格受其他政策的帕累托支配。我运用这个模型来分析再分配的动态激励。

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Inefficient voting with identical voters

This paper constructs a two-period electoral model where the future is uncertain and the policy in each period is decided by majority rule. The voters’ optimal future policy takes into account all possible future realizations, while the future pivotal median voter only cares about the median value of the future distribution. This dynamic conflict of interest implies that the electoral outcome may be strictly Pareto-dominated by other policies even in cases where all voters are identical and have the same beliefs for the future. I apply the model to analyze the dynamic incentives for redistribution.

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来源期刊

Journal of Theoretical Politics POLITICAL SCIENCE-

CiteScore

2.10

自引率

10.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Theoretical Politics is an international journal one of whose principal aims is to foster the development of theory in the study of political processes. It provides a forum for the publication of original papers seeking to make genuinely theoretical contributions to the study of politics. The journal includes rigorous analytical articles on a range of theoretical topics. In particular, it focuses on new theoretical work which is broadly accessible to social scientists and contributes to our understanding of political processes. It also includes original syntheses of recent theoretical developments in diverse fields.