反思意识的HOOR理论

IF 1.6 4区 心理学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Adriana Renero, Richard Brown
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引用次数: 0

摘要

意识的高阶理论通常根据一个人的高阶思维是有意识的来解释内省,这需要三阶思维——即对精神状态的思考。在这项工作中,我们提供了另一种内省的描述,它建立在最近现象意识的高阶表征(HOOR)理论的基础上。根据HOOR理论,现象意识在于拥有正确的高阶表征。我们声称,这一理论可以扩展到内省,因为我们认识到有一种独特的意识——即内省意识——可以像该理论对现象意识所做的那样加以解释。我们将这种新颖的观点称为:有意为内省意识而进行的高阶表征(HORIFIC)。我们认为,有独立的理由认为内省意识可以是“刺激诱导的”或“自我触发的”,我们发展的观点的好处之一是它可以接受多元方法。我们的观点还解释了特定的高阶表征代表了什么样的特定精神状态,以及我们在内省意识的特定情况下意识到精神状态之间的变化、过渡和边界的方式。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A HOROR Theory for Introspective Consciousness
Higher-order theories of consciousness typically account for introspection in terms of one's higher-order thoughts being conscious, which would require a third-order thought — i.e.a thought about a thought about a mental state. In this work, we offer an alternative account of introspection that builds on the recent HigherOrder Representation of a Representation (HOROR) theory of phenomenal consciousness. According to HOROR theory, phenomenal consciousness consists in having the right kind of higher-order representation. We claim that this theory can be extended to introspection by recognizing that there is a distinctive kind of consciousness — i.e. introspective consciousness — which can be accounted for as the theory does for phenomenal consciousness generally. We call this novel view: Higher-Order Representation Intentionally For Introspective Consciousness (HORIFIC). We argue that there are independent reasons for thinking that introspective consciousness can be either 'stimuli-induced' or 'self-triggered' and that one of the benefits of the view we develop is that it can embrace a pluralist approach. Our view also accounts for what specific mental state is represented by a particular higher-order representation, and for the way in which we are aware of changes, transitions, and boundaries between mental states in specific cases of introspective consciousness.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.00
自引率
14.30%
发文量
58
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