{"title":"戈萨奇检验:甘迪诉美国,限制行政国家,以及非授权的未来","authors":"John Hall","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3550906","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In Gundy v. United States, for the first time since 1935, four justices expressed a willingness to revisit the nondelegation doctrine that has been left undisturbed for over eighty years. Justice Neil Gorsuch proposed a new test for approaching nondelegation challenges. He averred that a legislature can only give power under three circumstances: (1) to “fill up the details”; (2) to make the application of a rule dependent on certain executive fact-finding; or (3) to assign non-legislative responsibilities to either the judicial or executive branch. The three prongs of his analysis form the new Gorsuch test. \n \nGiven the split on the issue, the importance of understanding Justice Gorsuch’s Gundy dissent becomes paramount. This student Note is one of the first academic pieces to situate the Gorsuch test within the nondelegation doctrine. It argues that the test is stricter than any prior version and would severely curtail the ability of Congress to give agencies power, thus limiting the administrative state. \n \nPart I introduces the disputed statute in Gundy, the factual circumstances underlying the case, the debates in the briefs and at oral argument, and the three fractured opinions. The case history reveals the neither the Court nor the parties significantly considered a new test for the nondelegation doctrine. Justice Gorsuch’s dissenting opinion, outlined in Part I, has three salient features: a statutory reading, an originalism discussion, and his proposal. Part II considers the original understanding and history of the nondelegation doctrine, criticizing Justice Gorsuch for omitting pertinent evidence from the text, constitutional convention, early legislation, contemporary state interpretations, and the first Supreme Court nondelegation opinions. Then, it explores the case law and past proposals for a narrower nondelegation test than the “intelligible principle,” emphasizing that no court has ever rigorously enforced the nondelegation principle, even as the administrative state grew exponentially. Part III considers the weaknesses and potential impact of the Gorsuch test. It analyzes Justice Gorsuch’s previous opinion on the question, past Supreme Court nondelegation tests, the effects on other broad statutes, the need for doctrinal clarity, and a potential application of his proposal. Ultimately, this Note concludes that the problems of clarity and application caution against its adoption.","PeriodicalId":47625,"journal":{"name":"Duke Law Journal","volume":"70 1","pages":"175-215"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8000,"publicationDate":"2020-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Gorsuch Test: Gundy v. United States, Limiting the Administrative State, and the Future of Nondelegation\",\"authors\":\"John Hall\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3550906\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In Gundy v. United States, for the first time since 1935, four justices expressed a willingness to revisit the nondelegation doctrine that has been left undisturbed for over eighty years. Justice Neil Gorsuch proposed a new test for approaching nondelegation challenges. He averred that a legislature can only give power under three circumstances: (1) to “fill up the details”; (2) to make the application of a rule dependent on certain executive fact-finding; or (3) to assign non-legislative responsibilities to either the judicial or executive branch. The three prongs of his analysis form the new Gorsuch test. \\n \\nGiven the split on the issue, the importance of understanding Justice Gorsuch’s Gundy dissent becomes paramount. This student Note is one of the first academic pieces to situate the Gorsuch test within the nondelegation doctrine. It argues that the test is stricter than any prior version and would severely curtail the ability of Congress to give agencies power, thus limiting the administrative state. \\n \\nPart I introduces the disputed statute in Gundy, the factual circumstances underlying the case, the debates in the briefs and at oral argument, and the three fractured opinions. The case history reveals the neither the Court nor the parties significantly considered a new test for the nondelegation doctrine. Justice Gorsuch’s dissenting opinion, outlined in Part I, has three salient features: a statutory reading, an originalism discussion, and his proposal. Part II considers the original understanding and history of the nondelegation doctrine, criticizing Justice Gorsuch for omitting pertinent evidence from the text, constitutional convention, early legislation, contemporary state interpretations, and the first Supreme Court nondelegation opinions. Then, it explores the case law and past proposals for a narrower nondelegation test than the “intelligible principle,” emphasizing that no court has ever rigorously enforced the nondelegation principle, even as the administrative state grew exponentially. Part III considers the weaknesses and potential impact of the Gorsuch test. It analyzes Justice Gorsuch’s previous opinion on the question, past Supreme Court nondelegation tests, the effects on other broad statutes, the need for doctrinal clarity, and a potential application of his proposal. Ultimately, this Note concludes that the problems of clarity and application caution against its adoption.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47625,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Duke Law Journal\",\"volume\":\"70 1\",\"pages\":\"175-215\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-03-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Duke Law Journal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3550906\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Duke Law Journal","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3550906","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
摘要
在甘迪诉美国案(Gundy v. United States)中,自1935年以来首次有四名大法官表示愿意重新审视80多年来未曾受到干扰的非授权原则。大法官尼尔·戈萨奇(Neil Gorsuch)提出了一项新的测试,以应对非授权挑战。他强调,立法机关只能在三种情况下授权:(1)“填补细节”;(二)使规则的适用依赖于行政机关的某些事实认定;或者(3)将非立法责任分配给司法或行政部门。他的分析的三个方面构成了新的戈萨奇测试。考虑到在这个问题上的分歧,理解戈萨奇大法官的甘迪异议的重要性变得至关重要。这篇学生笔记是第一批将戈萨奇测试置于非授权原则中的学术文章之一。它辩称,该测试比以往任何版本都要严格,并将严重削弱国会赋予机构权力的能力,从而限制行政国家。第一部分介绍了甘迪案中有争议的法规,案件背后的事实情况,摘要和口头辩论中的辩论,以及三种分裂的意见。案例历史表明,法院和当事人都没有认真考虑过对非授权原则的新考验。第一部分概述了戈萨奇大法官的反对意见,它有三个显著特点:法定解读、原旨主义讨论和他的提案。第二部分考虑了非授权原则的原始理解和历史,批评戈萨奇大法官从文本、宪法惯例、早期立法、当代国家解释和最高法院第一份非授权意见中省略了相关证据。然后,它探讨了判例法和比“可理解原则”更狭窄的非授权测试的过去建议,强调没有法院严格执行非授权原则,即使行政国家呈指数级增长。第三部分考虑了戈萨奇测试的弱点和潜在影响。它分析了戈萨奇法官之前对这个问题的意见,最高法院过去的非授权测试,对其他广泛法规的影响,对教义清晰度的需求,以及他的提议的潜在应用。最后,本说明的结论是,明确性和应用方面的问题告诫不宜采用该办法。
The Gorsuch Test: Gundy v. United States, Limiting the Administrative State, and the Future of Nondelegation
In Gundy v. United States, for the first time since 1935, four justices expressed a willingness to revisit the nondelegation doctrine that has been left undisturbed for over eighty years. Justice Neil Gorsuch proposed a new test for approaching nondelegation challenges. He averred that a legislature can only give power under three circumstances: (1) to “fill up the details”; (2) to make the application of a rule dependent on certain executive fact-finding; or (3) to assign non-legislative responsibilities to either the judicial or executive branch. The three prongs of his analysis form the new Gorsuch test.
Given the split on the issue, the importance of understanding Justice Gorsuch’s Gundy dissent becomes paramount. This student Note is one of the first academic pieces to situate the Gorsuch test within the nondelegation doctrine. It argues that the test is stricter than any prior version and would severely curtail the ability of Congress to give agencies power, thus limiting the administrative state.
Part I introduces the disputed statute in Gundy, the factual circumstances underlying the case, the debates in the briefs and at oral argument, and the three fractured opinions. The case history reveals the neither the Court nor the parties significantly considered a new test for the nondelegation doctrine. Justice Gorsuch’s dissenting opinion, outlined in Part I, has three salient features: a statutory reading, an originalism discussion, and his proposal. Part II considers the original understanding and history of the nondelegation doctrine, criticizing Justice Gorsuch for omitting pertinent evidence from the text, constitutional convention, early legislation, contemporary state interpretations, and the first Supreme Court nondelegation opinions. Then, it explores the case law and past proposals for a narrower nondelegation test than the “intelligible principle,” emphasizing that no court has ever rigorously enforced the nondelegation principle, even as the administrative state grew exponentially. Part III considers the weaknesses and potential impact of the Gorsuch test. It analyzes Justice Gorsuch’s previous opinion on the question, past Supreme Court nondelegation tests, the effects on other broad statutes, the need for doctrinal clarity, and a potential application of his proposal. Ultimately, this Note concludes that the problems of clarity and application caution against its adoption.
期刊介绍:
The first issue of what was to become the Duke Law Journal was published in March 1951 as the Duke Bar Journal. Created to provide a medium for student expression, the Duke Bar Journal consisted entirely of student-written and student-edited work until 1953, when it began publishing faculty contributions. To reflect the inclusion of faculty scholarship, the Duke Bar Journal became the Duke Law Journal in 1957. In 1969, the Journal published its inaugural Administrative Law Symposium issue, a tradition that continues today. Volume 1 of the Duke Bar Journal spanned two issues and 259 pages. In 1959, the Journal grew to four issues and 649 pages, growing again in 1970 to six issues and 1263 pages. Today, the Duke Law Journal publishes eight issues per volume. Our staff is committed to the purpose set forth in our constitution: to publish legal writing of superior quality. We seek to publish a collection of outstanding scholarship from established legal writers, up-and-coming authors, and our own student editors.