廉价谈话游戏中的简单调解

IF 0.6 Q4 ECONOMICS

Games Pub Date : 2023-06-02 DOI:10.3390/g14030047

C. Ganguly, I. Ray

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引用次数: 11

摘要

在Crawford-Sobel(统一二次效用)廉价谈话模型中，我们考虑了一种简单的中介方案(通信设备)，在该方案中，知情的代理将分区的N个可能元素中的一个报告给中介，然后中介根据该设备的概率分布向不知情的决策者建议N个行动中的一个。我们发现，当偏好散度参数(偏差)较小时，这种简单的介导均衡不能改善无介导的n -划分Crawford-Sobel均衡。

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Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game

In the Crawford–Sobel (uniform, quadratic utility) cheap-talk model, we consider a simple mediation scheme (a communication device) in which the informed agent reports one of the N possible elements of a partition to the mediator and then the mediator suggests one of the N actions to the uninformed decision-maker according to the probability distribution of the device. We show that no such simple mediated equilibrium can improve upon the unmediated N-partition Crawford–Sobel equilibrium when the preference divergence parameter (bias) is small.

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来源期刊

Games Decision Sciences-Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

CiteScore

1.60

自引率

11.10%

发文量

审稿时长

11 weeks

期刊介绍： Games (ISSN 2073-4336) is an international, peer-reviewed, quick-refereeing open access journal (free for readers), which provides an advanced forum for studies related to strategic interaction, game theory and its applications, and decision making. The aim is to provide an interdisciplinary forum for all behavioral sciences and related fields, including economics, psychology, political science, mathematics, computer science, and biology (including animal behavior). To guarantee a rapid refereeing and editorial process, Games follows standard publication practices in the natural sciences.